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INTRODUCTION 
 
Australia, with the exception of its indigenous peoples, is a land of recent migrants. Our 
national anthem proclaims that, “For those who’ve come across the seas, we’ve boundless 
plains to share.”1 However, this has never been an unconditional offer. Immigration laws 
in Australia have often disclosed, “deeply xenophobic hostility,”2 towards foreigners. 
 
Fear of the ‘yellow peril’, the supposed hordes of Chinese, “bent on overrunning White 
Australia and destroying its way of life forever,”3 prompted racially discriminatory 
immigration restrictions as early as 1855.4 One of the first statutes passed after Federation 
was the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth),5 which introduced the ‘dictation test’. By 
effectively precluding non-white immigrants, the test was the means by which the ‘White 
Australia’ policy was implemented.6 
 
Since 1992, Australia’s immigration laws have established a regime of mandatory 
detention for ‘unlawful non-citizens’.7 However, it was in 2001 that immigration issues 
powerfully captured the public imagination during the Tampa ‘crisis’.8 The debate about 
the mandatory detention of ‘unlawful non-citizens’ has dominated headlines in Australia 
and overseas since then.9 
                                                          
1 Advance Australia Fair, national anthem of the Commonwealth of Australia, Second Verse. 
2 Mary Crock and Ben Saul, Future Seekers: Refugees and the Law in Australia (2002), 1. 
3 Desmond Manderson, From Mr Sin to Mr Big: A History of Australian Drug Laws (1993), 17. 
4 In the colony of Victoria, An Act to Make Provision for Certain Immigrants, 18 Vict. c.39 (1855). 
5 George Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (1999), 26. 
6 For discussion of the ‘dictation test’ and ‘White Australia’ policy, see: Tony Blackshield and George 
Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials (3rd ed, 2002), 854-5; 
Mary Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia (1998), 1-19 (including an example of a ‘dictation 
test’ at 15); Crock and Saul, above n2, 1. 
7 The first mandatory detention provisions were inserted into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by the Migration 
Amendment Act 1992 (Cth). 
8 See Blackshield and Williams, above n6, 522-6; Crock and Saul, above n2, 35-42. 
9 A selection of relevant materials appears in Crock and Saul, above n2, 75-98. 
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Against that background, this thesis considers the international and domestic legality of 
Australia’s mandatory detention of ‘unlawful non-citizens’10 under the Migration Act 
1958 (Cth).11 The underlying proposition is that the regime of immigration detention in 
Australia is intended to be mandatory for all ‘unlawful non-citizens’, and effectively 
beyond the control of Australian courts. This thesis aims to test the international and 
domestic legality of that regime. 
 
In focussing on the detention of ‘unlawful non-citizens’ as a legal issue in itself, this thesis 
deals only peripherally with issues relating to the conditions of detention.12 For the 
purpose of this thesis, it is not important whether detention occurs in remote desert 
outposts or inner-city luxury hotels.13 At the heart of the issue is the fact that a detained 
person is, “deprived of personal liberty except as a result of conviction for an offence”.14 
 
In Chapter I, the position under international human rights law will be analysed. After 
considering the legal nature of international human rights law and tracing the evolution of 
international regulation of human rights, the key issue will be the international prohibition 
of arbitrary detention, which will be considered as a norm of international human rights 
law, under the relevant conventions and under the relevant body of ‘soft law’.15 
 
                                                          
10 An ‘unlawful non-citizen’ is not a criminal. Their presence in Australia is ‘unlawful’ because they fail to 
comply with the requirement that non-citizens hold a visa: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 13(1), 14(1). 
11 The relevant provisions appear in Division 7 of Part 2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). 
12 If immigration detention is internationally wrongful in itself, no conditions can remedy that illegality, 
although the conditions may themselves constitute additional breaches of international human rights law. 
13 In Amuur v France (1992) 22 EHRR 533, the European Commission on Human Rights held that the 
detention of a group of asylum seekers at a hotel near the airport where they arrived breached Article 5 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 Nov 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 Sept 1953). 
14 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, GA 
Res 43/173, UN GAOR, 43rd sess, 76th plen mtg, UN Doc. A/43/49 (1988) (‘Body of Principles’), Use of 
Terms. 
15 The concept of ‘soft law’ is discussed below at 10. 
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Having determined the scope of the international prohibition of arbitrary detention, the 
Australian system of immigration detention will be tested for compliance with the 
requirements of international human rights law. It will be argued that immigration 
detention in Australia is in breach of international law and in violation of the international 
prohibition of arbitrary detention. 
 
In Chapter II, the status of international human rights law in Australia will be examined, to 
determine what domestic consequences flow from international illegality. The relationship 
between international law and Australian law will be discussed at length. In addition to the 
case law on this point, the underlying issues will be analysed in depth. 
 
This discussion leads into a focus on two areas where possible future legal directions are 
examined. First, the use of international law as a tool of constitutional interpretation will 
be discussed. Second, the argument that there are certain fundamental common law rights 
which parliament may not abrogate will be considered. Both arguments challenge the 
traditional view of the relationship between international law and Australian law, and the 
accepted current position that although immigration detention may be in breach of 
international human rights law, this has little, if any, legal significance in Australia. 
 
In Chapter III, consideration turns to other provisions of Australian law which may be 
relevant to the legality of immigration detention. This chapter has a dual focus, discussing 
first the scope of Commonwealth legislative power, and then the existence of any limits to 
be derived from the exclusive vesting of judicial power in those courts specified in 
Chapter III of the Constitution. 
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The current orthodoxy is that immigration detention is legal under Australian law, 
notwithstanding that it may be illegal under international law. This thesis explains the 
theoretical and legal basis of that view, but also challenges that view, exploring 
considerations that point to the domestic illegality of immigration detention. It is argued 
that international illegality is relevant to Australian law, and that international human 
rights law has a part to play in the development and definition of Australian law. 
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CHAPTER I: IMMIGRATION DETENTION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Introduction to international human rights law 
 
The first chapter considers the status of immigration detention under international law. 
The evolution and sources of international human rights law will be discussed, to provide 
a background to the detailed consideration of the international prohibition of arbitrary 
detention which follows. 
 
The international regulation of human rights is a relatively new phenomenon, although the 
concept of human rights is much older and, “traces of rights talk can be found in ancient 
Greek and Roman philosophy.”16 International concern for human rights developed later, 
with the evolution of international humanitarian law dealing with armed conflict.17 
 
The body of international human rights law that is known today emerged in the wake of 
World War II, and at its heart, “consists of the United Nations Charter and related 
instruments.”18 The Charter of the United Nations19 provides that, “the United Nations 
shall promote…universal respect for; and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”20 
 
                                                          
16 Hilary Charlesworth, Writing in Rights: Australia and the Protection of Human Rights (2002), 43. 
17 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 479-80 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and 
Gummow JJ) 
18 Henry J Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (2nd ed, 
2000), 136. 
19 Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, [1945] ATS 1, (entered into force 24 
October 1945). 
20 Charter of the United Nations, above n19, art 55(c). 
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The Charter of the United Nations contains no detailed human rights provisions, but it is 
from the practice of the United Nations that international human rights law has emerged. 
The first step towards international protection of human rights came in 1948 with the 
adoption by the General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(‘UDHR’).21 
 
The UDHR begins by reciting the powerful motive behind its adoption, proclaiming that, 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” As the 
first comprehensive definition of universal human rights, the UDHR, “has become a 
powerful authority for, and symbol of, the protection of human rights.”22 Indeed, as the 
foundation of the system of international human rights law, the UDHR has been called, 
“possibly the single most important document created in the twentieth century”.23 
 
 
Sources of international human rights law 
 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice24 lists the sources of 
international law. The two major sources for the purposes of this discussion are: 
 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
                                                          
21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A, UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc. 
A/810 (1948). 
22 Williams, above n4, 3. 
23 Peter Bailey, “The Creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” 
<http://www.universalrights.net/main/creation.htm> at 28 September 2002. 
24 Statute of the International Court of Justice, incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations, above n19. 
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An international convention becomes binding on a state when it accepts the provisions of 
that convention, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.25 
Customary international law, as evidenced by state practice and opinio juris, binds all 
states. For the purposes of this thesis, customary international law will not be considered 
in depth. Rather, reliance will be placed on the relevant norms of international human 
rights law established by treaties, as enriched by the body of relevant ‘soft law’. 
 
‘Soft law’ is not mentioned in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, but is a relevant legal consideration.26 ‘Soft law’ is a concept unique to 
international law, although it has some familiar elements for lawyers from a common law 
tradition.27 ‘Soft law’ can be defined as, “guidelines of conduct…which are neither strictly 
binding norms of law, nor completely irrelevant political maxims, and operate in a grey 
zone between law and politics.”28 In the context of international human rights law, ‘soft 
law’ instruments serve the important purpose of better defining and developing the 
principles of human rights law which are set down in the relevant treaties. 
 
As Steiner and Alston point out, in considering international human rights law it is 
important to have, “an appreciation of its close relation to and reliance on international 
organizations.”29 The actions of the United Nations are of great importance in generating a 
body of ‘soft law’ relating to international human rights. This body of ‘soft law’, 
                                                          
25 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered 
into force 27 January 1980). 
26 Some ‘soft law’ norms may achieve traditional legal status either by representing a codification of existing 
customary international law at the time of adoption, or by a process of ‘crystallization of custom’ around the 
‘soft law’ instrument, by which it comes to represent customary international law. The International Court of 
Justice considered the relationship between ‘soft law’ instruments and customary international law in: 
Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 2, 40-44. 
27 On the issue of ‘soft law’ see: Christine M Chinkin, “The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and 
Change in International Law” (1989) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 850. 
28 Peter Malanczuk (ed), Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to Public International Law (7th rev ed, 1997), 54. 
29 Steiner and Alston, above n18, 137. 
Page 11 of 99 
consisting of resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs, and decisions of 
bodies which operate under the auspices of the United Nations, is vital to an understanding 
of the provisions of the treaties which form the basis of international human rights law. 
 
 
A right of individuals or of states? 
 
There is an inherent contradiction in analysing international human rights law in 
accordance with the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Individuals have no 
standing to bring an action before the International Court of Justice,30 even if they allege a 
violation of their human rights. This is an important procedural limitation, requiring 
individuals to rely on their own government to prosecute any claims of human rights 
violations on their behalf in the International Court of Justice.31 
 
There is disagreement about whether the state, in such a case, is asserting its own right, or 
asserting the right on behalf of the individual.32 In 1950, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht argued 
that, “the legal position is not that the state asserts its own exclusive right but that it 
enforces, in substance, the right of the individual who, as the law now stands, is incapable 
of asserting it in the international sphere.”33 
 
                                                          
30 Statute of the International Court of Justice, above n24, Article 34(1). 
31 See: Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994), 51. 
32 The cases on this point brought before the International Court of Justice have also involved the right to 
consular assistance: Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v United States of America) 
(Provisional Measures) [1998] ICJ Rep 257; LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) (Provisional 
Measures) [1999] ICJ Rep 4; LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) (Merits) 40 ILM 1069 (2001). 
See also: Louis Henkin, “Provisional Measures, US Treaty Obligations, and the States,” (1998) 92 American 
Journal of International Law 679. 
33 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1950), 27; quoted with approval in 
Higgins, above n34, 53. 
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This view has been borne out by developments which permit individuals to assert their 
human rights before bodies established under human rights treaties and under the Charter 
of the United Nations. Whilst lacking enforcement powers, these bodies illustrate that 
international human rights law has developed mechanisms to assist individuals to bring 
claims that their human rights have been violated. 
 
However, with the exception of the individual complaints mechanisms, two significant 
issues arise from the fact that a state must bring a claim on behalf of its own nationals. 
First, the weakness of the nationality-of-claims rule is that, “it is from his own government 
that an individual often most needs protection.”34 A refugee, by definition, has a, “well-
founded fear of persecution,” in their country of nationality.35 This virtually excludes any 
‘asylum seeker’ from state enforcement. 
 
Second, primary legal enforcement of international human rights law occurs not in the 
international sphere, but in the domestic courts of states. This is a serious weakness 
because international human rights instruments, “deprived as they are of jurisdictional 
enforcement, are ultimately left to the good will of the signatory states.”36 
 
To deal with this challenge, international human rights law places a binding legal 
obligation on states to provide for enforcement of international human rights in domestic 
courts. It will be seen in Chapter II that Australia has not comprehensively done this. In 
failing to protect international human rights, Australia is not alone: 
                                                          
34 Higgins, above n34, 95. 
35 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150, art 
1A(2) (entered into force 22 April 1954). 
36 Giovanni Conso, “Epilogue – Looking to the Future”, in Roy S Lee (ed), The International Criminal 
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute – Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999) 471, 476. 
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The failure on the part of many states to implement the standards in the 
elaboration of which they themselves have played a part and by which they 
may be legally bound under international law represents a major challenge in 
the field of human rights protection.37 
 
 
However, as the International Court of Justice has pointed out, “the lack of means of 
execution and the lack of binding force are two different matters.”38 Difficulties faced by 
individuals wishing to enforce their human rights do not detract from the binding nature of 
international human rights law. 
 
 
The international prohibition of arbitrary detention 
 
It has been said that, “arbitrary arrest and detention have been the most consistent 
violations of fundamental individual human rights throughout history.”39 It is not 
surprising, against that background, that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
contains two provisions dealing with the issue of arbitrary detention. 
 
Article 3 of the UDHR states that, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person.” In specifically protecting the right to liberty and security of the person, the 
UDHR draws on the existence of this right, “in all major human rights declarations 
beginning with the Magna Carta (1215) and the French Revolution (1789),” in giving 
effect to, “one of the most fundamental of human rights.”40 
                                                          
37 Helena Cook, “International Standards and Individual Protection”, in Stanislaw Frankowski and Dinah 
Shelton (eds), Preventive Detention: A Comparative and International Law Perspective (1992) 1, 52. 
38 LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) (Merits) 40 ILM 1069 (2001), 1095. See also: Thomas M 
Franck, “Legitimacy in the International System” (1988) 82 American Journal of International Law 705. 
39 M Cherif Bassiouni, “Preface” in Frankowski and Shelton (eds), above n37, xi. 
40 Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen, “Article 9” in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: A Commentary (1992) 147, 147. 
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However, the right to liberty of the person is not an absolute right. It is given greater 
definition by Article 9, which provides that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile.” By doing so, the UDHR acknowledges a fundamental distinction. 
 
Deprivation of personal liberty in the form of imprisonment…has long 
represented the most common means used by the State to fight crime and 
maintain internal security…the basic right of personal liberty does not strive 
toward the ideal of a complete abolition of State measures that deprive 
liberty…It is not the deprivation of liberty in and of itself that is disapproved of 
but rather that which is arbitrary and unlawful.41 
 
 
Although the UDHR was an important step in the development of international human 
rights law, its legal status was that of, “a recommendation by the General Assembly…that 
would exert a moral and political influence on states rather than constitute a legally 
binding instrument”.42 Nonetheless, in the time since the adoption of the UDHR, certain 
fundamental principles have come to be applied as international law, most notably by the 
International Court of Justice in the Tehran Hostages Case: 
 
Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to 
physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly 
incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well 




The trilogy of instruments that constitute the International Bill of Rights, which began 
with the UDHR in 1948, was completed in 1976, when the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
                                                          
41 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (1993), 159-60. 
42 Steiner and Alston, above n18, 138. However, note that much of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights could now be said to represent customary international law: Bailey, above n23. 
43 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran) (Merits) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, 
42. 
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and Cultural Rights44 entered into force. The Covenants go beyond the UDHR by 
providing much more specific detail on human rights, as well as by virtue of their status as 
treaties binding on all state parties. 
 
The relevant provisions of the ICCPR build upon the prohibition of arbitrary detention 
contained in the UDHR. It should be noted that the prohibition of arbitrary detention also 
appears in each of the regional human rights conventions.45 
 
Australia’s ratification of the ICCPR attracts two crucial provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.46 Article 26 makes the ICCPR legally binding on 
Australia internationally and requires its obligations to be performed in good faith – ‘pacta 
sunt servanda’.47 Article 27 reiterates the fundamental principle that no provision of 
domestic law may be relied upon to excuse or justify a breach of international law.48 
 
The international prohibition of arbitrary detention appears in Article 9 of the ICCPR, 
which is extracted below. Article 9(1) sets out the basic principle, and Article 9(4) deals 
with the related right to bring proceedings which challenge the legality of any detention. 
Both provisions are relevant to Australia’s regime of immigration detention. 
 
                                                          
44 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 
45 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 Nov 1969, OASTS 36, art 7 (entered into 
force 18 July 1978); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
above n13, art 5; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, opened for signature 27 June 1981, 21 
ILM 58 (1982), art 6 (entered into force 21 Oct 1986); Arab Charter on Human Rights, Council of the 
League of Arab States, Resolution 5437 (102nd regular session), 15 September 1994, reproduced in (1997) 
18 Human Rights Law Journal 151, arts 5, 8. 
46 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n25. 
47 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n25, art 26. 
48 See also: Higgins, above n31, 205; The SS Wimbledon [1923] PCIJ (Ser. A), No 1. 
Page 16 of 99 
To determine the scope of the international prohibition of arbitrary detention, the correct 
interpretation of Article 9 of the ICCPR must be found. In order to do this, the provisions 
of international law dealing with the interpretation of treaties will be considered, as will 
the applicable body of ‘soft law’. 
 
 
Interpretation of Article 9 of the ICCPR 
 
To determine the correct interpretation of Article 9 of the ICCPR, the basic principle to be 
applied is that, “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.”49 The starting point then is the text of the covenant itself. 
 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 
established by law. 
… 
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled 
to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without 




Article 9(1) first sets out the right to liberty and security of the person as the broad 
principle involved. It goes on to define the right to liberty and security of the person in 
terms of two separate wrongs which are impermissible – first, “arbitrary arrest and 
detention”; second, “deprivation of liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedure as are established by law”. Giving the ‘ordinary meaning’ to those terms, it 
                                                          
49 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n25, art 31(1). 
50 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n44, art 9. 
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can be seen that Article 9(1) contains a dual requirement. Detention must not only be legal 
according to domestic law, it must also not be arbitrary.51 
 
In other words, “a detention that is lawful may nonetheless be arbitrary,”52 under 
international law. This view is confirmed in light of the object and purpose of the ICCPR, 
as, “for international human rights to be meaningful there ha[s] to be an international 
minimum standard that limits the legislative power of the States.”53 
 
Further, under Article 2(2), states are required to give domestic effect to the rights 
enshrined in the ICCPR.54 Any interpretation of Article 9(1) that was satisfied with 
domestic legality alone would be hollow, allowing a state to avoid its Article 9(1) 
obligations by breaching its Article 2(2) obligations, which would not be acceptable in the 
light of the object and purpose of the ICCPR as a core international human rights treaty. 
 
Further confirmation of this interpretation is provided by the travaux préparatoires of the 
ICCPR.55 Article 9(1) initially mirrored Article 5 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,56 listing several permissible 
deprivations of liberty but lacking an overarching prohibition of arbitrary detention.57 
 
                                                          
51 Australia challenged this view in A v Australia, arguing that domestic legality is all that is required. 
Australia’s position is discussed in: Sam Blay and Ryszard Piotrowicz, “The Artfulness of Lawfulness: 
Some Reflections on the Tension between International and Domestic Law” (2000) 21 Australian Yearbook 
of International Law 1, 7-8. 
52 Cook, above n37, 8. See also Nowak, above n41, 172. 
53 Niemi-Kiesiläinen, above n40, 150. See also Blay and Piotrowicz, above n51, 13 and 18. 
54 The Soviet representative emphasised this point during drafting: Nowak, above n41, 171. 
55 This is a permissible use of the travaux: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n25, art 32. 
56 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, above n13. 
57 The requirement that detention not be arbitrary, in addition to being in accordance with domestic law, has 
also been read into Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, above n13, in light of the object and purpose of that treaty: Blay and Piotrowicz, 
above n51, 15, citing Johnson v United Kingdom (1997) VII Eur Court HR 2391, [60]. 
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Those permissible deprivations were imprisonment and pre-trial detention, detention for 
failure to obey a court order, detention on grounds of mental illness, custody of minors 
and detention of aliens prior to expulsion.58 Soon proposals had emerged for around 40 
permissible deprivations of liberty, including for persons with contagious diseases, enemy 
aliens or aliens generally, spies, suicidal persons and witnesses.59 
 
The attempt to define permissible deprivations of liberty was problematic. The legal 
position is not that particular categories of persons may be subject to unlimited detention, 
but that greater detention may be permissible for certain persons according to particular 
risks they may face or dangers they may pose. In addition, it was feared that a 
compendious list would risk becoming a charter for human rights violations.60 
 
It was Australia that suggested the solution that became part of the ICCPR – the 
overarching requirement that detention not be arbitrary.61 Discussions during drafting 
reveal that the meaning of arbitrary, “contained elements of injustice, unpredictability, 
unreasonableness, capriciousness and [dis]proportionality.”62 More detailed elaboration on 
the meaning of arbitrary is available by reference to the applicable body of ‘soft law’, 
which includes General Assembly resolutions and the jurisprudence of international 




                                                          
58 Nowak, above n41, 164. 
59 See: Nowak, above n41, 164; Marc J Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1987), 187-202. 
60 Bossuyt, above n59, 193. 
61 See Nowak, above n41, 164; Bossuyt, above n59, 187-91, 194-6. 
62 Nowak, above n41, 172. 
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The Body of Principles 
 
In 1988, the General Assembly adopted the Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.63 The Body of Principles applies 
to, “any person deprived of personal liberty except as a result of conviction for an 
offence”.64 As a General Assembly resolution, the Body of Principles is ‘soft law’. Nigel 
Rodley has expressed the value to be attached to the Body of Principles as follows: 
 
In approving the Body of Principles, the General Assembly urged ‘that every 
effort be made so that the Body of Principles becomes generally known and 
respected’. This is strongly supportive language, but certainly not such as to 
suggest that the Assembly was seeking to promote their recognition as legally 
binding. Yet the language of many of the principles is peremptory, so clearly 
they are intended to be persuasive. As is often the case with such ‘soft law’ 
instruments, its principal value (from the perspective of international law) will 
be in assisting governments and relevant international bodies in interpreting 
and applying broader, but more recognizably legal norms.65 
 
 
Principle 4 is vital to the issue of what makes detention arbitrary. It requires that: 
 
Any form of detention or imprisonment and all measures affecting the human 
rights of a person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be 




A ‘judicial or other authority’ is defined to be, “a judicial or other authority under the law 
whose status and tenure should afford the strongest possible guarantees of competence, 
                                                          
63 Body of Principles, above n14. 
64 Ibid, Use of Terms. 
65 Nigel S Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (2nd ed, 1999), 333. 
66 Body of Principles, above n14, Principle 4. 
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impartiality and independence.”67 There is no relevant ‘other authority’ under the 
Migration Act satisfying these criteria, so in Australia this expression means a court.68 
 
Under section 189 of the Migration Act, immigration detention is an automatic statutory 
requirement for any person in Australia who is neither an Australian citizen nor the holder 
of a visa which is in effect – that is, all ‘unlawful non-citizens’.69 Immigration detention is 
initiated by an ‘officer’ which is defined in section 5 of the Migration Act to include a vast 
array of public officials. Immigration detention is not ordered by a court. 
 
The next point to examine is whether detention is, “subject to the effective control of, a 
judicial or other authority”. Effective control is not defined in the Body of Principles. 
However, the scope of this requirement has been explored by the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, which I deal with below at page 27. The Working Group considered 
that, “what is required is an effective alternative remedy which would entitle the appellate 
authority to consider on their merits,”70 the initial decisions to impose detention. 
 
There is no provision in the Migration Act allowing a court to consider the detention of an 
‘unlawful non-citizen’. Rather, under section 196, release is possible only if the person has 
ceased to be an ‘unlawful non-citizen’,71 either by leaving Australia or being granted a 
                                                          
67 Ibid, Use of Terms. 
68 The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs enjoys very significant powers under 
the Migration Act, which are either delegated or directly exercised, however lacking any guarantee or 
impartiality or independence, neither the Minister nor any delegate of the Minister, can be said to constitute 
an ‘other authority’ for these purposes. 
69 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s189(1): “If an officer knows or reasonably suspects that a person…is an 
unlawful non-citizen, the officer must detain the person.” The term ‘unlawful non-citizen’ is defined by the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss13(1), 14(1). 
70 Opinion No. 34/2000 (United States of America), concerning Jan Borek, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1, 
20 [21]. 
71 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s196(3) claims that it, “prevents the release, even by a court, of an unlawful 
non-citizen from detention,” unless they have ceased to be an ‘unlawful non-citizen’. To the extent (if any) 
that it attempts to prevent the release by a court of an ‘unlawful non-citizen’ whose detention is illegal (as to 
which see Chapter III) this provision would be invalid: see Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, 
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 (‘Lim’s Case’). 
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visa. Further, the privative clause (section 474) prevents any court from reviewing 
decisions concerning deportation or visas.72 The requirement of an effective remedy 
allowing for judicial consideration of the merits of the decision to detain is not satisfied. 
 
Principle 4 further requires that , “all measures affecting the human rights,” of a detainee 
be subject to the effective control of a court. The Migration Act provisions dealing with 
the detention of ‘unlawful non-citizens’ are silent on the conditions of detention, and 
provide no basis for any argument concerning the human rights of a detainee. In the 
absence of an overarching Bill of Rights, or any Migration Act provisions dealing with 
human rights, detainees find themselves in the same position as prisoners, unable to 
challenge their detention on the basis of the conditions of detention.73 
 
Hence, on the initiation of detention, the availability of court review of continued 
detention and the availability of court review of the conditions of detention, Australia fails 






                                                          
72 All visa and deportation decisions come within the scope of the privative clause in s474 of the Migration 
Act, the validity of which in light of s75(v) of the Constitution has not been finally determined. The Federal 
Court considered this issue in NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs 
[2002] FCAFC 228 (Unreported, Black CJ, Beaumont, Wilcox, French and von Doussa JJ, 15 August 2002). 
73 See: Ex parte Williams (1934) 51 CLR 545, 549-50 (Dixon J); Prisoners A to XX Inclusive v New South 
Wales (1995) 79 A Crim R 377; R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison; Ex parte Hague [1992] 1 AC 58; 
Stephen Livingstone and Tim Owen, Prison Law (2nd ed, 1999), 51-4, 180-1; David Brown and Meredith 
Wilkie (eds), Prisoners as Citizens: Human Rights in Australian Prisons (2002). Prerogative writs are not 
applicable, as they enable an order of release from detention if it is illegal, but the legality of detention 
cannot presently be challenged on the basis of the conditions of detention (see Chapter III). 
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Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals 
 
The Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country 
in which they Live,74 has two relevant articles. As a General Assembly resolution it is ‘soft 
law’, although it essentially reiterates that the ‘hard’ provisions of the ICCPR apply to 
individuals who are not nationals of the country in which they live. Article 2(1) reinforces 
the primacy of international human rights law over domestic laws, whilst article 5(1)(a) 
provides that, “no alien shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.” 
 
 
Jurisprudence of international human rights bodies 
 
There are two important institutions which consider allegations of violations of the 
international prohibition of arbitrary detention. Both institutions operate under the 
auspices of the United Nations, although the Human Rights Committee is a treaty-
monitoring body, established under the ICCPR; whereas the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention is a charter-based body, established under the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
 
The Human Rights Committee 
 
The Human Rights Committee is established under Article 28 of the ICCPR to monitor 
compliance with the ICCPR.75 It consists of 18 independent human rights experts. 
                                                          
74 Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they Live, 
GA Res 40/144, UN GAOR, 40th sess, 116th plen mtg, UN Doc. A/RES/40/144 (1985). 
75 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n44, art 28. 
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Pursuant to Article 40(4), the Human Rights Committee has the competence to issue 
‘general comments’ which, “clarify states’ obligations and interpret the substantive 
provisions of the Covenant.”76 
 
In its ‘general comment’ on Article 9,77 the Human Rights Committee first points out that 
the Article 9(1) prohibition of arbitrary detention, “is applicable to all deprivations of 
liberty, whether in criminal cases or in other cases…[including] immigration control”.78 It 
continues to discuss the scope of the Article 9(4) requirement of control by a court. 
 
The important guarantee laid down in paragraph 4, i.e. the right to control by a 
court of the legality of the detention, applies to all persons deprived of their 
liberty by arrest or detention. Furthermore, States parties have in accordance 
with article 2 (3) also to ensure that an effective remedy is provided in other 




The (First) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights80 
allows individuals to bring complaints to the Human Rights Committee alleging a 
violation of their rights under the ICCPR.81 The jurisprudence of the Human Rights 
Committee is an important additional source of guidance in interpreting the ICCPR. 
 
In Hugo van Alphen v The Netherlands, the Human Rights Committee interpreted Article 
9(1) of the ICCPR consistently with the interpretation developed above: 
                                                          
76 Henry J Steiner, “Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the Human Rights 
Committee?” in Philip Alston and James Crawford (eds), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty 
Monitoring (2000) 15, 21. 
77 General Comment 8: Right to liberty and security of persons (Article 9), Human Rights Committee, 16th 
session, 30 June 1982, reproduced in UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 (1994), 8. 
78 Ibid [1]. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
81 The Optional Protocol applies to Australia from 25 December 1991: K L B-W v Australia, HRC 
Communication No. 499/1992, 30 March 1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/47/D/499/1992. 
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The drafting history of article 9, paragraph 1, confirms that "arbitrariness" is 
not to be equated with "against the law", but must be interpreted more broadly 
to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability. 
This means that remand in custody pursuant to lawful arrest must not only be 
lawful but reasonable in all the circumstances. Further, remand in custody must 
be necessary in all the circumstances, for example, to prevent flight, 
interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime.82 
 
 
The Human Rights Committee held that detention which is consistent with domestic law 
will be arbitrary if it is not both reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances. It 
subsequently applied this dual requirement to Australia. 
 
 
A v Australia 
 
The most relevant opinion of the Human Rights Committee to immigration detention in 
Australia is the successful challenge to detention in A v Australia.83 The legislation at that 
time differs from the current regime, as A was a ‘designated person’, the provisions for 
whom now appear in Division 6 of Part 2 of the Migration Act. However, none of those 
differences is material to the views of the Human Rights Committee on the scope of the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention in Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
 
The Human Rights Committee agreed with Australia that it is not, “per se arbitrary to 
detain individuals requesting asylum.”84 The Human Rights Committee then recalled 
another aspect of its opinion in Van Alphen that, “every decision to keep a person in 
detention should be open to review periodically so that the grounds justifying the 
                                                          
82 Hugo van Alphen v The Netherlands, HRC Communication No. 305/1988, 15 August 1990, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988, [5.8]. 
83 A v Australia, HRC Communication No. 560/1993, 30 April 1997, UN Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993. 
84 Ibid [9.4]. 
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detention can be assessed.”85 The Human Rights Committee then went on to discuss the 
justification that would be required. 
 
In any event, detention should not continue beyond the period for which the 
State can provide appropriate justification. For example, the fact of illegal 
entry may indicate a need for investigation and there may be other factors 
particular to the individual, such as the likelihood of absconding and lack of 
cooperation, which may justify detention for a period. Without such factors 
detention may be considered arbitrary, even if entry was illegal. In the instant 
case, the State party has not advanced any grounds particular to the author's 
case, which would justify his continued detention…The Committee therefore 
concludes that the author's detention…was arbitrary.86 
 
 
The most notable element of this passage is the requirement for individual justification of 
detention. This is consistent with the proposition that human rights are individual rights, 
so every person deprived of their liberty has a right to have their detention justified on 
grounds appropriate to them. However, Australia has never adopted an individualized 
approach to immigration detention. Under the Migration Act, it has been determined in 
advance that all ‘unlawful non-citizens’ will be detained. 
 
The Immigration Minister justifies detention on the basis that detainees are, “readily 
available during processing of visa applications,” and, “immediately available for health 
checks,” as well as, “available for removal from Australia if their claims are not 
successful,” and finally, “to protect the Australian community”.87 
 
However, absent any individual reasons for detention, such as the chance of an individual 
being unavailable for processing and health checks, or the change of an individual 
                                                          
85 Ibid [9.4]. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Phillip Ruddock MP (Minister for Immigration), "Australian Immigration Minister - Frequently Asked 
Questions - Detention Issues" <http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/faq/detention.htm> at 6 October 2002. 
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absconding to avoid deportation, or the risk posed by a particular individual to the 
Australian community, immigration detention is in breach of Article 9(1) of the ICCPR. 
 
The other relevant provision of the ICCPR is Article 9(4) which requires that a detainee be 
entitled to take proceedings before a court to decide, “on the lawfulness of his detention 
and order his release if the detention is not lawful”. In its decision in A v Australia, the 
Human Rights Committee also dealt with this issue. 
 
In the Committee's opinion, court review of the lawfulness of detention under 
article 9, paragraph 4, which must include the possibility of ordering release, is 
not limited to mere compliance of the detention with domestic law. While 
domestic legal systems may institute differing methods for ensuring court 
review of administrative detention, what is decisive for the purposes of article 
9, paragraph 4, is that such review is, in its effects, real and not merely formal. 
By stipulating that the court must have the power to order release "if the 
detention is not lawful", article 9, paragraph 4, requires that the court be 
empowered to order release, if the detention is incompatible with the 
requirements in article 9, paragraph 1, or in other provisions of the Covenant.88 
 
 
The Human Rights Committee went on to consider the type of review available in 
Australia. As review in A’s case was limited to, “a formal assessment of the self-evident 
fact that he was indeed a "designated person",”89 the Human Rights Committee found that 
Australia was in breach of Article 9(4) as well. 
 
In order to satisfy article 9(4), the Human Rights Committee required both that review by a 
court be, “real and not merely formal,” and that courts have the power to order release if 
detention is inconsistent with article 9(1), or other provisions of the ICCPR. As discussed 
earlier at page 20, under the current regime court review is limited to a formal assessment 
that a detainee is an ‘unlawful non-citizen’. As will be discussed in Chapter II, Australia 
                                                          
88 A v Australia, above n83, [9.5]. 
89 Ibid. 
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has not domestically implemented the ICCPR, and no court has the power to order the 
release of a detainee on the grounds of a breach of the ICCPR. 
 
Based on the interpretation of article 9 of the ICCPR adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee in A v Australia, the current regime of immigration detention in Australia 
would breach both article 9(1) and article 9(4) of the ICCPR, by failing to involve any 
individual justification of detention, by failing to meet tests of necessity and 
reasonableness in any event, and by failing to provide for adequate review of the fact and 
conditions of detention by a court. Australia’s mandatory detention of ‘unlawful non-
citizens’ is illegal and breaches the international prohibition of arbitrary detention. 
 
 
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
 
The main human rights organ of the United Nations is the Commission on Human Rights, 
which operates under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council.90 The 
Commission on Human Rights has established a Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: 
 
composed of five independent experts, with the task of investigating cases of 
detention imposed arbitrarily or otherwise inconsistently with the relevant 
international standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
or in the relevant international legal instruments accepted by the States 
concerned.91 
 
The considerations of the Working Group are relevant in two areas. First, the Working 
Group has specifically considered the detention of ‘asylum seekers’. Second, it has 
                                                          
90 The Economic and Social Council is established under Chapter 10 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
above n24. The Commission on Human Rights is established pursuant to Article 68. 
91 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (1993), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/24. For a list of 
instruments considered, see: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (1998), UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/44, Annex I – Revised Methods of Work, [7]. 
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considered a number of cases dealing with immigration detention of persons unable to be 
deported. Both areas are relevant to Australia’s immigration detention. 
 
The majority of ‘unlawful non-citizens’ detained in Australia are ‘asylum seekers’, that is, 
they claim to be refugees, and invoke Australia’s obligations as a party to the Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees, and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.92 The 
Working Group has adopted Deliberation No 5 on the, “situation regarding immigrants 
and asylum-seekers”.93 The Deliberation details the safeguards which would be required in 
an acceptable regime of immigration detention. These include: 
 
Principle 3: Any asylum-seeker or immigrant placed in custody must be 
brought promptly before a judicial or other authority. 
 
Principle 6: The decision must be taken by a duly empowered authority with a 
sufficient level of responsibility and must be founded on criteria of legality 
established by the law.  
 
Principle 7: A maximum period should be set by law and the custody may in 
no case be unlimited or of excessive length.  
 
Principle 8: Notification of the custodial measure must be given in writing, in a 
language understood by the asylum-seeker or immigrant, stating the grounds 
for the measure; it shall set out the conditions under which the asylum-seeker 
or immigrant must be able to apply for a remedy to a judicial authority, which 
shall decide promptly on the lawfulness of the measure and, where appropriate, 
order the release of the person concerned.  
 
 
Beginning with the initial taking into custody of an ‘unlawful non-citizen’, Australia 
consistently fails to comply with the guarantees sought by the Working Group. Principle 3 
requires that detainees be brought promptly before a court,94 so that the legality of their 
detention may be examined on its merits. In Australia, detainees are not brought before a 
                                                          
92 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, above n35; Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967). 
93 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (2000), UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4, Annex II. 
94 Above at note 68 it is explained why ‘judicial or other authority’ in Australia can only mean a court. 
Page 29 of 99 
court to examine the legality of their detention.95 Further, detention is automatic, not a 
decision taken in accordance with Principle 6; no maximum period of detention is set, in 
violation of Principle 7; and detailed information of the nature required by Principle 8 is 
not provided, nor is there the possibility of review required by Principle 8. 
 
These violations of the guarantees expected by the Working Group, at every stage of the 
process of detention, again bring seriously into question the compliance of Australia’s 
immigration detention with the international prohibition of arbitrary detention. In May 
2002, the Working Group conducted a visit to Australia to investigate Australia’s 
mandatory detention of ‘unlawful non-citizens’. Their views will be known when their 
report is presented to the Commission on Human Rights in early 2003. 
 
Reference to the Working Group is also relevant because it has considered a number of 
cases dealing with immigration detention of persons unable to be deported. These cases 
have arisen in the United States of America in the context of Cuban nationals. The same 
issues are now relevant to Australia, with Australia recently experiencing difficulty 
deporting certain Palestinian and Iraqi nationals. 
 
In Australia, problems arise in two different ways. Either a detainee has been denied a 
visa, has exhausted all legal remedies, and has been ordered to be deported; or a detainee 
has applied in writing to be deported before a final determination.96 In both circumstances, 
the Migration Act requires their continued and indefinite detention until deportation, even 
though there may be no reasonable prospect of deportation occurring. 
 
                                                          
95 Detainees may initiate habeas corpus proceedings to determine the legality of their detention, but this falls 
short of the requirement that all detainees be ‘brought promptly’ before a court. 
96 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s198(1). 
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The Working Group has adopted general criteria for determining when detention is 
arbitrary, which are set out as paragraph 3 of each of the opinions of the Working Group. 
The Working Group has pointed out that this definition has been, “approved on numerous 
occasions by the Commission on Human Rights.”97 That approval lends support to the 
definition, which defines three categories of arbitrary detention. 
 
Category I arbitrary detention arises where detention, “manifestly cannot be justified on 
any legal basis”. Immigration detention may be Category I arbitrary detention, 
notwithstanding domestic legality. In the case of four Cuban nationals who had no 
criminal history but had been detained in the United States of America (‘US’) for 10 years, 
the Working Group found detention to be arbitrary under Category I.98 In the absence of 
any individual justification of the reasonableness and necessity of detention, Australia’s 
immigration detention would be Category I arbitrary detention in most cases. 
 
Category II arbitrary detention arises where, “the deprivation of liberty is the result of a 
judgement or sentence for the exercise of the rights and freedoms proclaimed,” by certain 
provisions of the UDHR and ICCPR. This includes Article 14(1) of the UDHR: “Everyone 
has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”. This does 
not mean that all detention of ‘asylum seekers’ is arbitrary, as there has been no judgment 
or sentence, but it would be arbitrary if a criminal offence of seeking to enter Australia 
without authority were to be created.99 
 
                                                          
97 Opinion No. 11/2000 (Peru), concerning Eleuterio Zárate Luján, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, 76 
[11]. 
98 Opinion No. 6/1997 (United States of America), concerning Felix Gomez, Angel Benito and Candido 
Rodriguez Sanchez, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/44/Add.1. 
99 A more complex argument might look at the motives of immigration detention, and if they were found to 
be punitive, conclude that detainees were being punished for exercising the right to seek asylum protected in 
Article 14(1) of the UDHR. This argument will not be pursued here. 
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Category III arbitrary detention arises where there is, “complete or partial non-observance 
of the international standards relating to a fair trial.” This category has been considered by 
the Working Group in several cases dealing with the detention of deportees in the US. 
These cases highlight the requirements for a non-arbitrary scheme of preventive or 
security detention designed to protect society from dangerous persons. 
 
The relevant US legislation required that all deportees be detained pending deportation. 
After the elapse of 90 days without deportation, they would be conditionally released 
unless the Attorney-General decided otherwise, for the reason that they posed a “risk to 
the community” or a serious risk of absconding.100 Even in the case of deportees with a 
criminal record who had served prison sentences in the US, the Working Group found 
detention to be arbitrary on several occasions.101 
 
However, there was one case where detention was found not to be arbitrary. Severino 
Puentes Sosa102 had been either serving criminal sentences or in immigration detention for 
most of the 20 years he had been in the US. There were two safeguards: the requirement 
that the Attorney-General release detainees unless they were a “risk to the community”, 
and a requirement of a parole hearing once a year. 
 
The Working Group found, after reviewing his extensive criminal and parole history, that, 
“whenever Mr. Puentes Sosa has been granted parole he has not only failed to comply 
with the conditions of parole but has on repeated occasions committed serious criminal 
                                                          
100 The relevant laws of the United States of America are set out in the opinions of the Working Group. 
101 See eg: Opinion No. 32/1999 (United States of America), concerning Mohamed Bousloub, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, 34; Opinion No. 34/1999 (United States of America), concerning Israel Sacerio 
Pérez , UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, 42. 
102 Opinion No. 31/1999 (United States of America), concerning Severino Puentes Sosa, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, 28. 
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offences for which he was prosecuted.”103 On the basis of a number of criminal 
convictions, a history of bad behaviour on parole, and with the safeguard of an annual 
parole hearing, detention was held not to be arbitrary. 
 
Taking the above case as a guide, it would appear that a power of detention exercisable on 
the grounds of “risk to the community”, demonstrated by substantial evidence, coupled 
with appropriate safeguards, may constitute a permissible system of security detention. 
 
In Australia, s253(9) of the Migration Act allows the Minister or Secretary to release from 
detention a person awaiting deportation. However, this is an exception, the general rule 
being that there will be no release. Further, there is no requirement of good grounds for 
refusal to release, or indeed any consideration of release, and the decision is protected by 
the privative clause, which prevents any judicial consideration of the decision. In addition, 
there is no link drawn in Australia to any criminal history. 
 
Australia’s justification for detention104 falls far short of such considerations. The regime 
of immigration detention in Australia is not a permissible system of security detention. In 
any event, the evidence suggests that no risk is posed to Australia by the people in 
immigration detention.105 
                                                          
103 Ibid 32 [25]. 
104 See above at 25. 
105 In the period 1 July 2000 – 16 August 2002, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation conducted 
5986 security assessments of ‘unlawful non-citizens’. Not one ‘unlawful non-citizen’ received an adverse 
assessment: Evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Human Rights 
Subcommittee), Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 22 August 2002 (Dennis Richardson). 
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Conclusion on international legality 
 
International human rights law draws on the right to liberty and security of the person, 
which has long been acknowledged as a fundamental human right. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
give effect to this right by establishing an international prohibition of arbitrary detention. 
 
The scope of this prohibition is given further definition by the Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and the 
Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in 
which they Live. Valuable guidance is also available from the jurisprudence of the two 
relevant expert bodies: the Human Rights Committee, established under the ICCPR, and 
the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the Commission on Human Rights. 
 
Assuming, for present purposes, that Australia’s detention of ‘asylum seekers’ is 
consistent with domestic law, this is not sufficient for international legality. What is 
required is that all measures of detention can be shown to be both reasonable and 
necessary in the circumstances of each detainee, a justification which Australia does not 
attempt. Rather, the Migration Act requires that all ‘unlawful non-citizens’ be detained, 
insisting that no release is possible until a person is no longer an ‘unlawful non-citizen’. 
Beyond the reasonably narrow period when detention could be justified as reasonable and 
necessary,106 Australia’s immigration detention is in breach of the international prohibition 
of arbitrary detention. 
                                                          
106 This period will vary with the circumstances of each detainee, but would normally be limited to essential 
health and security checks. As an example, a ten day limit on detention is imposed in the United Kingdom. 
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Further, international law requires that the fact of detention and the conditions of detention 
be capable of a meaningful challenge before a court, which is also not possible under 
Australian law. Justification on the grounds of necessity and reasonableness cannot avoid 
the need to have effective control over detention by a court, and this lack of an effective 
legal challenge to detention and the conditions of detention is, of itself, a violation of the 
international prohibition of arbitrary detention.107 
 
Immigration detention in Australia is in breach of the international prohibition of arbitrary 
detention, and constitutes a violation of Australia’s obligations under Article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
                                                          
107 The suggestion that the conditions themselves violate many international human rights norms is discussed 
below at 79. 
Page 35 of 99 
CHAPTER II:  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN 
AUSTRALIA 
 
The reception of international law into Australian law 
 
Having reached the conclusion that Australia’s mandatory detention of ‘unlawful non-
citizens’ is in breach of the international prohibition of arbitrary detention, consideration 
must turn to what domestic consequences flow from this. This depends on the principles 
relating to the reception of international law into Australian law. 
 
Ancient authority can be found for the proposition that, “the law of nations, in its full 
extent was part of the law of England,”108 and that it would override acts of parliament.109 
In modern Australia, this is not the correct legal position. 
 
The importance of the recognition of human rights has long been appreciated by 
Australian courts. In Gerhardy v Brown,110 Justice Brennan said the following: 
 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are…rights and freedoms which 
every legal system ought to recognize and observe. They are inalienable rights 
and freedoms that a human being possesses simply in virtue of his 
humanity…which must be recognized and observed, and which a person must 
be able to enjoy and exercise, if he is to live as he was born – “free and equal 
in dignity and rights”, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
proclaims. The State and other persons are bound morally, though not legally, 
to recognize and observe those rights and freedoms.111 
 
 
                                                          
108 Triquet v Bath (1764) 3 Burr 1478, 97 ER 936 (Lord Mansfield); quoted in Blackshield and Williams, 
above n6, 762. 
109 Dr Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 107a, 77 ER 638, 118a (Coke CJ); cited and discussed in Williams, 
Human Rights, above n5, 15. 
110 (1985) 159 CLR 70. 
111 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 125-6 (Brennan J). 
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In contrast to the appreciation of the importance of human rights, it is the final sentence of 
that quote which reflects the legal position. The power exerted by international human 
rights in Australia may be regarded as purely moral, in which case there would be no legal 
enforcement of international human rights in Australia. In the High Court it has been held 
that, “a human right…is not itself necessarily a legal right”.112 
 
Patricia Hyndman points out that, “however extensive the acceptance by a government 
of…human rights instruments, texts alone cannot guarantee that the rights enumerated 
within them will, in fact, be translated into real and effective protection of those rights.113 
It is necessary to examine the relationship between international law and Australian law to 
determine whether or not international human rights are in fact protected in Australia. 
 
 
The theoretical approach 
 
There are several theories which have been advanced in an attempt to describe the 
relationship between international law and domestic legal systems. The fundamental 
theoretical division is between monist and dualist nations, as Rosalyn Higgins explains: 
 
Monists contend that there is but a single system of law, with international law 
being an element within it alongside all the various branches of domestic 
law…Dualists contend that there are two essentially different legal systems, 
existing side by side within different spheres of action – the international plane 
and the domestic plane.114 
                                                          
112 Mabo v Queensland (No 1) (1988) 166 CLR 186, 217 (Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
113 Patricia Hyndman, “Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the Effective Implementation of the 
International Standards of Human Rights” (2000) 21 Australian Yearbook of International Law 95, 111. 
114 Higgins, above n31, 205. For a discussion of this issue in Australia, see: Andrew D Mitchell, “Genocide, 
Human Rights Implementation and the Relationship between International Law and Domestic Law: 
Nulyarimma v Thompson” (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 15. 
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So far as either description applies, Australia is a dualist nation.115 There is no clearer 
example of this than cases where domestic laws have been upheld despite direct findings 
of international illegality.116 However, international law has been acknowledged to have 
direct relevance to Australian law in a range of matters as diverse as informing the 
common law, interpreting statutes and possibly the constitution, and administrative 
decision-making.117 The dualist theory fails to capture any of this interaction. 
 
The alternative theories of incorporation and transformation also fail to satisfactorily 
explain the relationship.118 Given the current state of the law, theoretical arguments appear 
to be a, “doctrinal dispute…largely without practical consequence”.119 No theory yet 
advanced is capable of fully explaining the relationship between international law and 
Australian law, which will now be examined in more detail. 
 
 
International law as an interpretive tool 
 
It is accepted in the jurisprudence of the High Court that international law can be relevant 
in informing the construction of Commonwealth statutes. Thus, it has been held that, 
“where a statute or subordinate legislation is ambiguous, the courts should favour that 
                                                          
115 Sir Michael Kirby, “Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Norms,” (1999) 5(2) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 109, 109. See also the emphatic comments of Justice Brennan in Re 
Citizen Limbo (1989) 92 ALR 81, 82-3 (Brennan J). 
116 See eg: Collins v South Australia (1999) 74 SASR 200, 215 (Millhouse J). 
117 The argument that Australia’s ratification of an international instrument has no effect on domestic law 
has been strongly criticised: Sir Anthony Mason, “The Influence of International and Transnational Law on 
Australian Municipal Law” (1996) 7 Public Law Review 20, 23. 
118 For a discussion of these theories see: Mitchell, above n114; Kristen Walker, “Treaties and the 
Internationalisation of Australian Law” in Cheryl Saunders (ed), Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason 
Court in Australia (1996) 204. 
119 Stephen Donoghue, “Balancing Sovereignty and International Law: The Domestic Impact of 
International Law in Australia” (1995) 17 Adelaide Law Review 213, 214. 
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construction which accords with Australia’s obligations under a treaty or international 
convention to which Australia is a party.”120 
 
Justice Deane has specifically held that, “a legislative provision would need to be quite 
unambiguous before I would construe it as disclosing an intention to…step towards the 
tyranny of arbitrary detention.”121 
 
However, in reality, “the terms of the majority of statutory provisions are, or are treated as 
if they are, unambiguous and therefore likely to be unaffected by this principle”.122 
Specifically, the provisions of the Migration Act providing for immigration detention 
appear to be unambiguous.123 In the absence of ambiguity, no rule of construction is 
required to interpret the clear words of the Migration Act. 
 
On several occasions the High Court has invoked international law as a source of guidance 
when interpreting and developing the common law. Justice Brennan expressed the 
relationship between the common law and international law as follows: 
 
The common law does not necessarily conform with international law, but 
international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of 
the common law, especially when international law declares the existence of 
universal human rights.124 
 
 
                                                          
120 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287 (Mason CJ and Deane J). 
121 South Australia v O’Shea (1987) 163 CLR 378, 420 (Deane J). 
122 Roger Douglas, Douglas and Jones’s Administrative Law (4th ed., 2002), 43. 
123 On this issue, I discuss the decision in Al Masri v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous 
Affairs [2002] FCA 1009 (Unreported, Merkel J, 15 August 2002) below at 81. 
124 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42 (Brennan J). Similar comments appear in Environment 
Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477, 499-500 (Mason CJ and Toohey J). 
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However, as the majority judgment in Western Australia v Commonwealth125 makes clear, 
domestic implementation of international law is not an end in itself. 
 
The common law may, it is true, find in international law concepts or values 
which may advantageously be used in the development of the common law, but 
the common law of native title is not developed in order to satisfy the 
obligations of a treaty.126 
 
 
Indeed, to whatever extent international law may influence the common law, there is one 
important qualification to be noted. Any international law principles brought into the 
common law, “would thereby attain only common law status: that is, they could be 
overridden by statute.”127 Accordingly, the Migration Act would override any suggested 
principles that might be incorporated into the common law from international law. 
 
Despite the accepted use of international law as an interpretive tool in the context of both 
statutes and the common law, in the case of the Migration Act provisions which establish 
the regime of immigration detention in Australia, these interpretive tools are not relevant. 
Any common law incorporation of international law would be overridden by a statute such 
as the Migration Act, and no tool of statutory interpretation is required, because the words 





                                                          
125 (1995) 183 CLR 373. 
126 Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 486 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, 
Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
127 Blackshield and Williams, above n6, 763. 
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Domestic consequences of ratification of ICCPR 
 
The structure of the Australian Constitution has significant bearing on the domestic 
consequences of Australia’s ratification of the ICCPR. The executive act of ratifying a 
treaty, which at the international level is the point at which legal obligations attach, does 
not automatically incorporate that treaty into domestic law.128 Put simply, “treaties do not 
have the force of law unless they are given that effect by statute”.129 
 
The domestic legal significance of Australia’s ratification of the ICCPR was specifically 
considered by the High Court in Dietrich v The Queen.130 
 
Ratification of the ICCPR as an executive act has no direct legal effect upon 
domestic law; the rights and obligations contained in the ICCPR are not 
incorporated into Australian law unless and until specific legislation is passed 
implementing the provisions.131 
 
 
Given that the ICCPR does not automatically take effect under Australian law, and that the 
role of international law in statutory interpretation and development of the common law is 
not relevant, the issue becomes to what extent legislation has implemented domestically 




                                                          
128 See: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 286-7 (Mason CJ and 
Deane J); Attorney-General for Canada v Attorney-General for Ontario, [1937] AC 326, 347 (Lord Atkin). 
129 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 570 (Gibbs CJ). 
130 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 (‘Dietrich’). 
131 Ibid 305 (Mason CJ and McHugh J). Principles of international law were also used in Mabo v 
Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, particularly by Justice Brennan: see above n124. 
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The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
 
The ICCPR has been indirectly brought into Australian law by the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), which establishes the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission (‘HREOC’). HREOC implements the approach taken by 
the Australian government to the domestic implementation of international human rights, 
which eschews legal processes in favour of, “less formal processes, often associated with 
inquiry, conciliation and report.”132 
 
Under the Australian Constitution, this is the only role HREOC can ever have. In 
Australia, “the Constitution remits to the judicial power of the Commonwealth the 
jurisdiction and authority to determine whether a subject has or has not contravened a law 
or regulation of the Commonwealth.”133 Accordingly, when the government constructed a 
scheme to give effect to the decisions of HREOC by registration with the Federal Court of 
Australia, it was held that this amounted to a usurpation of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth,134 and was struck down as unconstitutional. 
 
Consequently, HREOC can only recommend human rights be observed, it cannot legally 
enforce them. As Roger Douglas points out, “the fact that non-administrative tribunals 
(such as the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission) cannot make final 
enforceable orders seriously weakens such bodies.”135 
                                                          
132 Australia, Third Periodic Report to the Committee on Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 23 July 1998, UN Doc E/1994/104/Add.22, [21]. For discussion of the “tenuous” implementation of 
international human rights through HREOC, see: Hilary Charlesworth, Writing in Rights, above n16, 34. 
133 Victorian Chamber of Manufactures v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 413, 422 (Starke J); cited with 
approval in Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245, 269 (Deane, 
Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) (‘Brandy’). 
134 Brandy (1995) 183 CLR 245, 264 (Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ) and 269-71 (Deane, Dawson, 
Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
135 Douglas, above n122, 30. 
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Legislative incorporation 
 
The legislative power of the Commonwealth is not unlimited,136 but does include, under 
section 51(xxix) of the Constitution, power to make laws with respect to “external affairs”. 
The scope of the external affairs power is broad. “In relation to external affairs…the 
legislative power…extends to the enactment of laws implementing the provisions of 
treaties entered into by the Executive so as to bind the Commonwealth.137 
 
Under the external affairs power, the Commonwealth has the ability to domestically 
implement the ICCPR.138 However, it has not done so comprehensively, and cannot be 
forced to do so. Australia’s position has been summarised as follows: 
 
Australia appears to be Janus-faced with respect to human rights treaties. The 
internationally-oriented face basks in the international status it receives from 
being a party to the treaties, while the nationally-turned face is more diffident, 




Australia’s failure to meaningfully implement the ICCPR has led to the result that 
Australians must resort to communications to the Human Rights Committee, rather than 
domestic courts, to enforce their human rights. The argument most often raised against 
domestic implementation of international human rights is that this would undermine 
Australian ‘sovereignty’ in some manner. The opposite view is compelling: 
                                                          
136 This statement is axiomatic, notwithstanding the comments of Sir Daryl Dawson who wrote, shortly after 
his dissent in the Tasmanian Dam Case, that “the external affairs power may, as a matter of constitutional 
theory, be regarded as open-ended”: Sir Daryl Dawson, “The Constitution – Major Overhaul or Simple 
Tune-up?” (1984) 14 Melbourne University Law Review 353, 358. 
137 Victoria v Commonwealth (1995) 187 CLR 416, 476 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and 
Gummow JJ). 
138 Williams, Human Rights, above n5, 19. 
139 Charlesworth, Writing in Rights, above n16, 56. 
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It is extraordinary that the people of Australia must resort to an international 
body to seek redress in circumstances where it is alleged that Australia has not 
complied with the very international obligations that the government’s 
executive branch has explicitly stated that it will uphold, simply because the 
relevant convention has not been implemented into Australian domestic law. 
By not providing a mechanism for the Australian legal system to consider and 
adjudicate such issues before an international body does so, it seems that the 
government of Australia is in fact abrogating its sovereignty rather than 
exercising this sovereignty through the Australian legal system.140 
 
 
Responses to individual communications 
 
An examination of Australia’s responses to individual communications to the Human 
Rights Committee reveals the extent to which the ICCPR has been implemented in 
Australia, showing the powerful influence of political factors in this process. As Hilary 
Charlesworth has observed, “while the views of the committees constitute an authoritative 
interpretation of the treaties, there is little formal pressure on governments to accept 
interpretations adverse to their perceived interests.”141 
 
On two occasions, the Human Rights Committee has found Australia to be in breach of the 
ICCPR.142 Wayne Morgan has criticised the Australian Government’s approach as 
revealing, “a ‘passive / aggressive’ mentality,”143 accusing the government of failing to 
take meaningful action domestically whilst being overly aggressive internationally. There 
is some force in his comments, but there is also a sharp distinction between the two cases. 
 
                                                          
140 Mason, above n117, 28. 
141 Charlesworth, Writing in Rights, above n16, 62. 
142 Wayne Morgan, “Passive / Aggressive: the Australian Government’s responses to Optional Protocol 
communications”, (1999) 5(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 55, 61. 
143 Morgan, above n142, 55. 
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In response to Toonen v Australia,144 where the Human Rights Committee found Australia 
to be in breach of the ICCPR, the Commonwealth government enacted the Human Rights 
(Sexual Conduct) Act 1994 (Cth), which implemented part of the relevant article of the 
ICCPR.145 This was an effective response for two reasons. 
 
First, the result of Toonen’s case was the enactment of a Commonwealth law which 
remedied Australia’s breach of the ICCPR. Second, the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) 
Act has been said to create, “a fundamental right to privacy in relation to sexual conduct 
between adults”.146 This remains the only instance where legislation has specifically 
guaranteed the legal enforcement in Australia of a right guaranteed by the ICCPR. 
 
The result in Toonen can be contrasted with the reaction to A v Australia – rejection of the 
view of the Human Rights Committee; widening of the offending regime of immigration 
detention to now detain all ‘unlawful non-citizens’ not just ‘designated persons’; removal 
of the legislative provision imposing a time limit on detention;147 and significant 
questioning of international human rights norms and enforcement mechanisms.148 
 
Political motives provide one explanation for the different responses. In Toonen, the 
Commonwealth acted against the last state in Australia to persist with laws criminalising 
homosexuality. In contrast, one view could be that A was seen as an ‘outsider’ and 
undeserving of sympathy. Domestic responses to the opinions of the Human Rights 
Committee appear to be a function of political, not legal, processes. 
                                                          
144 Toonen v Australia, HRC Communication No. 488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992. This case is 
discussed in George Williams, A Bill of Rights for Australia (2000), 24-5. 
145 The Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act was the subject of the litigation in Croome v Tasmania (1997) 
191 CLR 119, although the offending sections of the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) were repealed before a 
final determination of the case by the High Court. 
146 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2001), 644. 
147 The former section 54Q of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) limited detention to 273 days – see Chapter III. 
148 See eg Morgan, above n142, 62. 
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International Law and Constitutional Interpretation 
 
The role of international law as an interpretive tool when considering statutes and the 
common law has already been considered, but it has been shown that neither is applicable 
in the context of the provisions of the Migration Act dealing with immigration detention. 
One very important issue remains. If international law is accepted as a legitimate source of 
guidance when interpreting statutes and the common law, is it also a legitimate source of 
guidance in the interpretation of the Australian Constitution? 
 
The traditional view of this concept is quite simple: “international law is not a "higher 
law", like the Constitution, with which statutes must comply…parliaments can legislate 
inconsistently with international norms”.149 The authority most often cited for this 
proposition is Polites v The Commonwealth,150 which dealt with two aliens who attempted 
to avoid Australian conscription during World War II on the basis of its illegality under 
international law. Despite finding international illegality,151 the result of the case was 
clear: “The Commonwealth Parliament can legislate…in breach of international law, 





                                                          
149 Blackshield and Williams, above n6, 765. 
150 Polites v The Commonwealth; Kandiolites v The Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60 (‘Polites’). 
151 Ibid 83 (Williams J). 
152 Ibid 69 (Latham CJ). The Chief Justice went on to point out that Australia may find itself without 
grounds for objection if its citizens were similarly treated overseas. This is surely a powerful consideration 
in the context of breaches of international human rights law. 
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An anachronistic view 
 
The body of international human rights law represents a fundamental change in the focus 
of international law, from concern purely for the relationship between nation states, to 
concern for issues once regarded as of an entirely ‘domestic nature’. International law has 
grown to the point where, “there are few issues of contemporary significance that are not 
directly or indirectly the subject of international law norms.”153 Sir Michael Kirby has 
referred to the magnitude of the developments which have occurred in the international 
sphere since the adoption of the Australian Constitution, and asked the following question: 
 
The fact that the Australian Constitution must now operate in a different 
international milieu is so obvious that it scarcely requires mention. Should not 




It has been said that, “the genius of the common law system consists in the ability of the 
Courts to mould the law to correspond with the contemporary values of society”.155 It 
would be surprising if constitutional interpretation were unable to do the same. Tony 
Blackshield has suggested that constitutional interpretation must be an evolving concept: 
 
A Constitution, like a Shakespearean tragedy, may in the end be susceptible of 
an infinite range of meanings. The task of the judge…is to find that view in the 




                                                          
153 Amelia Simpson and George Williams, “International Law and Constitutional Interpretation” (2000) 11 
Public Law Review 205, 206. 
154 Kirby, above n115, 124; see also Simpson and Williams, above n153, 205. 
155 Dietrich (1992) 177 CLR 292, 319 (Brennan J). 
156 A R Blackshield, “The Implied Freedom of Political Communication,” in Geoffrey Lindell (ed), Future 
Directions in Australian Constitutional Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Leslie Zines (1994) 232, 243. 
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The ‘living force’ approach to Constitutional interpretation appears to recognise that 
argument, when it stipulates: “The Constitution cannot be frozen by reference to the year 
1900 or thereabouts. The Constitution must be construed as a living force and the Court 
must take account of political, social and economic developments since that time.”157 
 
International law could offer, “a vast new source of guidance and norms,”158 with which to 
interpret the Australian Constitution. In recent years there have been suggestions that 
international law may be used as a tool of constitutional interpretation. This is a 
controversial issue, which has driven an ideological divide among the Justices of the High 
Court of Australia. The debate concerns the proper roles of the judiciary, the parliament 
and the executive under the Australian Constitution, with particular reference to the 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
The internationalisation of law does not undermine Australian sovereignty 
where international law norms are adopted by legislation or infuse the common 
law. In the former respect, the Parliament must directly lend its authority and in 
the latter it is able to override the common law…Interpreting the Constitution 
by reference to international law gives that law an entry point into Australia’s 
domestic law over which Parliament has no control. Parliament’s ability to opt 
out is lost.159 
 
 
The use of international law in constitutional interpretation has been criticised as an 
unacceptable judicial expansion into areas reserved for the Parliament. Equally it can 
be argued that using international law to interpret the Constitution is not tantamount 
to imposing international law as a constitution. This approach seeks to use 
international law to interpret the existing Constitution, not to impose a new one. 
                                                          
157 McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 200-201 (Toohey J). 
158 Simpson and Williams, above n153, 206. 
159 Ibid 225. 
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Parliamentary sovereignty and human rights 
 
The idea of parliamentary sovereignty has long been upheld in Australia.160 The 
basic principle is that, “a court, once it has ascertained the true scope and effect of 
valid legislation, should give unquestioned effect to it.”161 Thus, it has been held that: 
 
The court cannot deny the validity of an exercise of a legislative power 
expressly granted merely on the ground that the law abrogates human rights 
and fundamental freedoms or trenches upon political rights which, in the 
court’s opinion, should be preserved.162 
 
 
However, human rights protection should not be seen as incompatible with the concept of 
parliamentary supremacy, as the protection of human rights is not ‘undemocratic’. 
 
Human rights are not…against the interest of society; on the contrary, the good 
society is one in which individual rights flourish, and the promotion and 
protection of every individual’s rights are a public good. There is an aura of 
conflict between individual and society only in that individual rights are 
asserted against government…this apparent conflict between individual and 
society is specious; in the longer, deeper view, the society is better if the 
individual’s rights are respected.163 
 
 
As Hilary Charlesworth points out, “a richer understanding of democracy involves 
acknowledging that there are some rights that are so basic to human dignity that they 
should be taken out of the political arena and given special protection.”164 An 
interpretation of the Australian Constitution which draws on international human rights 
law does not necessarily conflict with the democratic basis of parliamentary sovereignty. 
                                                          
160 See eg: Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Company (1920) 28 CLR 129, 151-152 
(Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). 
161 Kruger v Commonwealth (1996) 190 CLR 1, 73 (Dawson J). 
162 Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 43 (Brennan J); cited in Williams, “Civil Liberties and the 
Constitution,” (1994) 5 Public Law Review 82, 83. 
163 Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (1990), 5; quoted in Blackshield and Williams, above n6, 1090. 
164 Hilary Charlesworth, Writing in Rights, above n16, 39. 
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Australia’s Constitution in historical perspective 
 
The Australian Constitution was adopted in 1901, at a time before international human 
rights law in its current form existed, when Australia was still very much influenced by its 
British heritage. In contrast to the United States, “no guarantee against deprivation of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law,”165 was incorporated.166 
 
In framing the Constitution the “guiding purpose” was not to protect 
fundamental freedom but to outline the legislative and executive power held by 
the federal and State tiers of government…the drafters, “wanted a Constitution 
that would make capitalist society hum”.167 
 
 
A century later, Australia differs from many other developed nations in lacking 
comprehensive human rights protection. “No parliament has taken the step of adopting a 
Bill of Rights, leaving Australia as the only western nation that does not have such an 
instrument.”168 It has been suggested that as a consequence of this, Australia is now 
isolated from other legal systems and that the significant use made of international human 
rights law in interpreting the constitutions of other countries is irrelevant to Australia.169 
 
Whilst care must certainly be taken not to apply the Constitution of another country to 
Australia, this is not a reason to ignore international and comparative law totally. It has 
been observed that, “the debate over the role of international law in Australia has been 
                                                          
165 R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556, 580 (Dixon and Evatt JJ); as 
quoted in Blackshield and Williams, above n6, 1106. 
166 Analysis of the Convention Debates, however, reveals that human rights protection was not universally 
and deliberately shunned in favour of parliamentary sovereignty: Williams, Human Rights, above n5, 25. 
167 Williams, “Civil Liberties,” above n162, 93; quoting Manning Clark, “The People and the Constitution” 
in Encel, Horne and Thompson (eds), Change the Rules! Towards a Democratic Constitution (1977), 18. 
168 Blackshield and Williams, above n6, 1099. 
169 Dietrich, (1992) 177 CLR 292, 317 (Brennan J). 
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insular.”170 The lack of a bill of rights need not isolate Australia from interaction with 
international human rights law. It simply requires that Australian courts be cautious to 
ensure their use of international and comparative norms is appropriate to Australia. 
 
 
A limited comparative perspective 
 
Notwithstanding the need for caution when considering the decisions of courts in 
countries which have a bill of rights, it is useful to look at the recent United Kingdom 
cases which considered the detention of people who, in Australia, would be described as 
‘unlawful non-citizens’. 
 
In Saadi,171 the Court of Appeal considered the legality of immigration detention both 
under ‘traditional’ English law and under English law following the incorporation of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.172 
The statutory scheme in the United Kingdom authorised detention for 10 days upon 
arrival. Under ‘traditional’ English law the position was summarised as follows. 
 
Faced with applications for asylum at the rate of nearly 7000 per month…a 
short period of detention is not an unreasonable price to pay in order to ensure 
the speedy resolution of the claims of a substantial proportion of the 
influx…such detention can properly be described as a measure of last resort.173 
 
 
                                                          
170 Gavan Griffith and Carolyn Evans, “Teoh and Visions of International Law”, (2000) 21 Australian Year 
Book of International Law 75, 89. 
171 R (Saadi and ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 1 WLR 356 (Court of Appeal) 
(‘Saadi’). The House of Lords heard argument in the appeal against this decision on 1 and 2 May 2002. 
Judgment had not been delivered at the time of printing. 
172 The position under English law following the incorporation is not relevant to Australia. However, the 
analysis of the ‘traditional’ position under English law is relevant to our discussion. 
173 Saadi [2002] 1 WLR 356, 385 (Lord Phillips MR for the Court). 
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The court considered the rate of unauthorized arrivals, the short period of detention and 
that the detention assisted in a speedy outcome. Legality was upheld by finding that 
detention was a “measure of last resort”. It appears unlikely that those same indicators 
would be satisfied in Australia, where detention is indefinite and processing often takes 
months or years, when in the busiest year, Australia’s boat arrivals averaged less than 350 
per month.174 Detention cannot be described as a ‘measure of last resort’ in Australia. 
 
In addition, a line of authority in the United Kingdom deals with a statutory discretion to 
detain pending deportation, establishing the so-called Hardial Singh principles. That is, 
although the power, “to detain individuals is not subject to any express limitation of 
time…it is…impliedly limited to a period which is reasonably necessary for that 
purpose”.175 This principle has been approved by the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council,176 where Lord Browne-Wilkinson reiterated that, “if it becomes clear the removal 
is not going to be possible within a reasonable time, further detention is not authorised.”177 
 
However, their Lordships left open the issue of legislative modification of this principle, 
but with the proviso that, “the courts should…be slow to hold that statutory provisions 
authorise administrative detention for unreasonable periods or in unreasonable 
circumstances”.178 This accorded with their view that courts should, “regard with extreme 
jealousy any claim by the executive to imprison a citizen without trial.”179 
 
                                                          
174 In the financial year 1999-2000, 4175 boat people arrived in Australia: Crock and Saul, above n2, 3. 
175 Regina v Governor of Durham Prison, Ex parte Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704, 706 (Woolf J). 
176 Tan Te Lam v Tai A Chau Detention Centre [1997] AC 97, 111 (‘Lam’). 
177 Ibid. The issue of a reasonable time is discussed below in Chapter III. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid 113-14. 
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The English cases reveal an important principle. Protection from arbitrary detention is a 
fundamental concept of the common law. Accordingly, international law, so far as it 
defines the international prohibition of arbitrary detention, should be seen as relevant to 
the scope of any common law protection. The judgment in Saadi concluded: 
 
We started this judgment by remarking that it was artificial to consider English 
domestic law and the Human Rights Convention separately. The Human Rights 
Act has made the Convention part of the constitution of the United Kingdom, 
but the Convention sets out values which our laws have reflected over 
centuries…The policies that have constrained…the exercise of the statutory 
power to detain aliens who arrive on our shores do not result from any 
conscious application of Article 5 of the Convention. They result from a 





The undue reticence of Australian courts 
 
A number of influential commentators have criticised the traditional approach taken by 
Australian courts to international law. As Hilary Charlesworth has noted, “the High Court 
has been very cautious in its embrace of international law; it has kept its gloves and hat on 
at all times.”181 Sometimes the High Court has been not only cautious, but hostile. It is 
clear that, “inertia based on hostility towards international norms should be rejected.”182 
 
The judiciary and the government should accept international law as a valuable 
source of ideas and obligations. With sensitive use, international standards and 
norms will inspire the development of domestic law that is responsive to 
individual rights and freedoms. This is a development to be embraced by a 
mature Commonwealth established by its Constitution as a free, open and 
democratic society.183 
 
                                                          
180 Saadi [2002] 1 WLR 356, 394 (Lord Phillips MR for the Court). 
181 Hilary Charlesworth, “Dangerous Liaisons: Globalisation and Australian Public Law” (1998) 20 Adelaide 
Law Review 57, 66. 
182 Griffith and Evans, above n170, 92-3. 
183 Ibid. 
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Notwithstanding the caution necessarily needed to ensure Australian courts stay within the 
limits of the Australian Constitution, it is suggested that it would be appropriate to 
approach international law in a more meaningful way. Failing to do so exposes Australia 
to the risk that, “our public and constitutional law will be impoverished and undermined 
by isolation from international developments.”184 Further, the current approach cannot be 
sustained in the modern world. 
 
Just as the Australian economy cannot be insulated from the impact of the 
international economy and the economies of other countries, so Australian 





Justice Kirby’s interpretive principle 
 
The emergence of a more open and responsive attitude to international law has been 
heralded by a series of judgments in which Justice Kirby develops a principled approach 
to the relationship between international law and constitutional interpretation. Writing 
extra-curially, Justice Kirby has invoked strong justification for this new approach. 
 
The age of reconciliation of international and national law has dawned in 
Australia…It is a development as natural to the age as jumbo jets, international 
informatics, pandemics, global warming and the international economy. In this 
little planet, we are ultimately bound together. Diminution in the human rights 
of others endangers peace and security elsewhere and offends the sensibilities 
of people everywhere, who are increasingly well informed on such matters.186 
 
 
                                                          
184 Charlesworth, “Dangerous Liaisons,” above n181, 72. 
185 Mason, above n117, 29. 
186 Kirby, above n115, 124-5. 
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In Newcrest Mining,187 Justice Kirby introduced his interpretive principle. 
 
International law is a legitimate and important influence on the 
development of the common law and constitutional law, especially when 
international law declares the existence of universal and fundamental 
rights. To the full extent that it’s text permits, Australia’s Constitution, as 
the fundamental law of government in this country, accommodates itself 
to international law…the Constitution not only speaks to the people of 
Australia who made it and accept it for their governance. It also speaks to 
the international community as the basic law of the Australian nation, 
which is a member of that community.188 
 
 
This is subject to the proviso that, “if the constitutional provision is clear and if a law 
is clearly within power, no rule of international law, and no treaty (including one to 
which Australia is a party) may override the Constitution or any law validly made 
under it.”189 However, even as a tool of constitutional interpretation, the interpretive 
principle has caused significant disagreement between members of the High Court. 
 
In Kartinyeri, Justices Gummow and Hayne rejected the approach of Justice Kirby: 
 
[S]ubmissions were made as to the scope of the legislative power in exercise of 
which the Bridge Act was enacted. In essence, the submissions sought to apply 
a rule for the construction of legislation passed in the exercise of the legislative 
power to limit the content of the legislative power itself. Such an attempt failed 
in Polites and in Horta and it should fail here.190 
 
 
                                                          
187 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513 
188 Ibid 657-8 (Kirby J). 
189 Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 417 (Kirby J) (‘Kartinyeri’). 
190 Ibid 386 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). This objection was first raised in Polites (1945) 70 CLR 60, 78 
(Dixon J). 
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In a more recent rejection, Chief Justice Gleeson, with Justices McHugh and Gummow, 
declared: “As to the Constitution, its provisions are not to be construed as subject to an 
implication said to be derived from international law.”191 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that four of Justice Kirby’s present colleagues have rejected the 
interpretive principle, it may well continue to attract attention in the future. 
 
 
Fundamental common law rights? 
 
Justice Kirby has not been alone on the High Court in considering the way in which 
Commonwealth heads of power should be construed in light of international human rights 
law. The opportunity arose in Kruger v Commonwealth192 to consider the international 
prohibition of the crime of genocide, in the context of the Commonwealth legislative 
power in s122 of the Constitution to make laws for the territories. The traditional view 
held that the power in s122 was, “plenary in quality and unlimited and unqualified in point 
of subject matter.”193 Justice Gaudron considered a radical departure from this: 
 
Were it necessary to decide the matter, I would hold that, whatever the position 
with respect to other heads of legislative power, s122 does not confer power to 




Although this is an extreme example, it is noteworthy that Justice Gaudron was willing to 
limit an express grant of power because of a principle of international human rights law. 
                                                          
191 AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 180 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
192 (1997) 190 CLR 1. 
193 Teori Tau v Commonwealth (1969) 119 CLR 564, 570. 
194 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 107 (Gaudron J). 
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However, the value of that finding is hard to determine, given that Justice Gaudron has not 
followed this decision with any other relevant uses of international law, and expressly 
stated that it was not necessary to decide the matter on the facts of Kruger. 
 
Much earlier, Justice Murphy also considered inherent limits on Commonwealth judicial 
power in several judgments during his time on the High Court. He was prepared to draw 
certain inferences from the Constitution protecting human rights, including an implication 
prohibiting, “arbitrary discrimination between the sexes.”195 Justice Murphy also found a 
significant constitutional protection against arbitrary deprivation of liberty: 
 
It is a Constitution for a free society. It would not be constitutionally 
permissible for the Parliament of Australia or any of the States to create or 
authorize slavery or serfdom. A law which (apart from justifications relating to 
infancy, unsoundness of mind, quarantine or administration of the criminal 
law) kept migrants or anyone else in a subordinate role inconsistent with the 




The judgments of Justice Murphy go much further than the interpretive principle of Justice 
Kirby. In doing so, they raise an issue which the High Court has asked, but never 
conclusively answered. That is the question of whether or not there are certain common 
law rights that ‘run so deep’ they may not be abrogated by the parliament. 
 
This question arose for consideration following a series of judgments by Sir Robin Cooke 
in New Zealand. The first indication of a possible limit derived from the common law 
came in 1982, when it was said that: “we have reservations as to the extent to which in 
                                                          
195 Ansett Transport Industries v Wardley (1980) 142 CLR 237, 267 (Murphy J). 
196 R v Director-General of Social Welfare (Victoria); Ex parte Henry (1975) 133 CLR 369, 388 (Murphy J). 
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New Zealand even an Act of Parliament can take away the rights of citizens to resort to 
the ordinary courts of law for the determination of their rights.”197 
 
His Honour later suggested that, “it is arguable that some common law rights may go so 
deep that even Parliament cannot be accepted by the Courts to have destroyed them”.198 
An indication of such a right was that: “I do not think that literal compulsion, by torture 
for instance, would be within the lawful powers of Parliament. Some common law rights 
presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not override them.”199 
 
There has been sporadic and often incidental consideration of the issues involved in 
Australia. For example, Justice Wilson found it relatively easy to dismiss an argument 
based on Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights. 
 
The validity of laws enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament falls to be 
determined by reference to the proper construction of the Australian 
Constitution. It is not open to base an argument for invalidity by reference to 
alleged inconsistencies between laws of the Commonwealth and either Magna 
Carta or the Bill of Rights.200 
 
 
The High Court has attracted attention to this issue by specifically raising it in a case 
where it did not need to be considered. In Union Steamship Co of Australia v King,201 the 
judgment of the Court referred to possible constraints on State legislative power,202 
obliquely stating that, “whether the exercise of that legislative power is subject to some 
                                                          
197 New Zealand Drivers’ Association v New Zealand Road Carriers [1982]1 NZLR 374, 390 (Cooke J). 
198 Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] 1 NZLR 116, 121 (Cooke J). 
199 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394, 398 (Cooke J). 
200 Re Cusack (1985) 66 ALR 93, 95 (Wilson J). 
201 Union Steamship Co of Australia v King (1988) 166 CLR 1. 
202 Presumably the same considerations would apply to Commonwealth legislative power. 
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restraints by reference to rights deeply rooted in our democratic system of government and 
the common law…is another question we need not explore.”203 
 
It is not clear what should be read into this specific mention. One commentator has 
supported the view that some rights must be so fundamental that they may not be 
abrogated, on the basis that to hold otherwise would be, “arbitrarily to privilege the 
principle of majority rule at the expense of other features of liberal democracy”.204 
 
More recently in Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales,205 an argument was made 
that the requirement s51(xxxi) of the Constitution that property be acquired “on just 
terms” was a right so fundamental to the common law that it could not be abrogated by a 
state parliament. The majority judgment decided that the acquisition of property on just 
terms is definitely not a right of sufficient importance. 
 
Whatever may be the scope of the inhibitions on legislative power involved in 
the question identified but not explored in Union Steamship, the requirement of 
compensation which answers the description “just” and “properly adequate” 
falls outside that field of discourse.206 
 
 
In the same case, Justice Callinan decided to, “reserve,” any possible decision on this 
point.207 Justice Kirby, however, had a very strong view as to the impropriety of such a 
course. Yet, at the same time, his Honour developed a different theory: 
 
                                                          
203 Union Steamship Co of Australia v King (1988) 166 CLR 1, 10. 
204 T R S Allen, “The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and First Principles,” in Saunders 
(ed), above n118 146, 146. 
205 Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399 (‘Durham Holdings’). 
206 Ibid 410 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
207 Ibid 433 (Callinan J). 
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The significance of the contemporary realization that the foundation of 
Australia’s Constitution lies in the will of the Australian people has not yet 
been fully explored…In Australia, considerations such as these, derived 
directly or indirectly from the Constitution, afford the likely future judicial 
response to any extreme affront masquerading as a State law. The answer lies 
in the implications derived from the Constitution, not in assertions by judges 
that the common law authorises them to ignore an otherwise valid law.208 
 
 
In rejecting the argument that fundamental rights may not be abrogated, Justice Kirby 
reached the same conclusion as Justice Dawson in the earlier case of Kruger.209 However, 
the reasons invoked were fundamentally different. For Justice Dawson, parliamentary 
sovereignty defeated any argument on fundamental rights. In contrast, Justice Kirby drew 
on the emerging theory of popular sovereignty which recognises that, “it is the people who 
are ultimately supreme, not their representatives.”210 
 
If there are indeed certain fundamental common law rights which are protected from 
legislative interference, there could be no clearer right to be protected than the right to 
liberty and security of the person. This is much more than an avenue for judicial 
imposition of, “idiosyncratic notions of what is fair and just”.211 
 
The right to liberty and security of the person can be traced back at least as far as Magna 
Carta (1215) and appears in all of the relevant modern international human rights 
instruments. It has been recognised and upheld through a thousand years of common law 
tradition, and is now comprehensively defined and protected under international human 
rights law. 
 
                                                          
208 Ibid 431-2 (Kirby J). 
209 Kruger v Commonwealth (1996) 190 CLR 1, 73 (Dawson J). 
210 Williams, “Civil Liberties,” above n162, 98. 
211 To borrow a phrase from Dietrich (1992) 177 CLR 292, 363-364 (Gaudron J). 
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As Justices Wilson and Dawson said in Williams v The Queen:212 
 
A person is not to be imprisoned otherwise than upon the authority of a justice 
or a court except to the extent reasonably necessary to bring him before the 
justice to be dealt with according to law. That, as we conceive it, is one of the 
foundations of the common law. It is by writ of habeas corpus that the 
immediate restoration to freedom of a person illegally detained may be 
achieved. That is a remedy as old as the law and was declared by the Bill of 
Rights 1688 to be so.213 
 
 
The issue of whether there are certain fundamental common law rights that may not be 
abrogated by parliament remains open. Powerful arguments can be made in support of 
such a contention, but these are as perceived radical by some. In the absence of strong 
judicial approval of such an approach, the more conventional analysis of the issues will be 
developed in Chapter III. 
 
 
                                                          
212 (1986) 161 CLR 278. 
213 Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278, 306 (Wilson and Dawson JJ). 
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Conclusion on international human rights law in Australia 
 
Despite Australia’s active participation in human rights internationally, within Australia 
international human rights law has not been given meaningful effect. Under the 
Constitution, the parliament is the appropriate body to implement international law in 
Australia. However, there is a very important legal dimension, as the Australian 
Constitution provides significant opportunity for courts to protect individual rights, but 
has been interpreted instead to reduce individual protection. 
 
Our common law tradition is rich in ideals corresponding to those of international human 
rights law, not least in the area of arbitrary detention, which draws on the long history of 
the common law writ of habeas corpus. However, courts have been very reluctant to 
consider international human rights law, and the guidance it could give to Australian law. 
 
Notwithstanding the majority conservative view, it is arguable that international human 
rights law should play a much more important part in constitutional interpretation in 
Australia. This development would not seek to apply international law as a new 
constitution, but to use it to interpret the Australian Constitution. 
 
A different approach may take the view that the right to liberty and security of the person 
is a common law right so fundamental that it may not be abrogated by parliament. Strong 
arguments can be made in support of such a proposition, although this is an argument 
which calls for a significant departure from the conservative view. It raises the issue of 
how far a system of government ruled by a written Constitution which is imbued with a 
separation of judicial power allows parliamentary sovereignty to extend. 
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The conclusion is that international human rights law currently plays a relatively limited 
role in Australian law. If immigration detention is internationally illegal, the prevailing 
view is that this does not create domestic rights or remedies. However, there are 
developing arguments which suggest that international law is relevant to interpreting the 
Australian Constitution, and should be recognised as such. International human rights law 
may also be relevant to defining certain, limited rights which are fundamental to our 
system of government. 
 
In the absence of majority approval of either of these approaches, the more traditional 
analysis of Australian constitutional law will now be undertaken, to reach a conclusion on 
the domestic legality of immigration detention. 
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CHAPTER III:  AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
The conclusion that international human rights law cannot be directly enforced in 
Australia does not determine the legality of immigration detention in Australia. The 
Australian Constitution may still deny the validity of the detention provisions under 
Australian law. There are two issues to be considered in this regard. The first is whether or 
not the legislative provisions are within the legislative power of the Commonwealth. The 
second is whether the otherwise valid legislation constitutes a usurpation of the judicial 
power of the Commonwealth, and thus is invalid under Chapter III of the Constitution. 
 
 
Detention under the microscope: Lim’s Case 
 
The most important consideration of the legality of immigration detention is the High 
Court decision in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and 
Ethnic Affairs (‘Lim’s Case’).214 The provisions challenged in Lim’s Case were the same 
provisions which were later the subject of the successful communication to the Human 
Rights Committee in A v Australia. 
 
The current Migration Act detention provisions differ from those considered in Lim’s 
Case, in lacking a provision to the effect of the former s54Q of the Migration Act which 
limited detention to 273 days. In addition, the regime considered in Lim’s Case applied 
only to ‘designated persons’ and not to all ‘unlawful non-citizens’. Notwithstanding the 
                                                          
214 Lim’s Case (1992) 176 CLR 1. This case is discussed in Williams, Human Rights, above n5, 205-9. 
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fact that detention is now indefinite and mandatory for all ‘unlawful non-citizens’, the 
principles considered by the High Court in Lim’s Case remain equally relevant. 
 
Analysis of the decision in Lim’s Case properly begins by setting out the position at 
common law. This provides a useful background to the issues which later arise. 
 
An alien who is within this country, whether lawfully or unlawfully, is not an 
outlaw. Neither public official nor private person can lawfully detain 
him…except under and in accordance with some positive authority conferred 
by the law. Since the common law knows neither lettre de cachet nor other 
executive warrant authorizing arbitrary arrest or detention, any officer of the 
Commonwealth Executive who purports to authorize or enforce the detention 
in custody of such an alien without judicial mandate will be acting lawfully 




The provisions of the Migration Act constitute just such an authorising statutory provision, 
to the extent that they are valid. The question then becomes whether or not the provisions 
establishing the regime of immigration detention in Australia are valid. 
 
 
Is detention within the legislative power of the Commonwealth? 
 
The first issue to be decided is whether the relevant provisions of the Migration Act indeed 
fall within any head of Commonwealth legislative power. The head of power used to 
support the Migration Act is the ‘aliens power’ in s51(xix) of the Constitution.216 
 
                                                          
215 Lim’s Case (1992) 176 CLR 1, 19 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ) and 63 (McHugh J), citing Re 
Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514, 528 (Deane J). 
216 The power in s51(xxvii) to make laws with respect to immigration and emigration, which was formerly 
relied on to support migration laws, is no longer considered, attention now focussing on the aliens power. 
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The heart of the aliens power 
 
The ‘aliens power’ is the legislative power, “to make laws…with respect to…aliens,” 
expressed in s51(xix) of the Constitution. However, a law is not valid under this power 
merely because it contains the word ‘alien’. It has been pointed out that, “the words "with 
respect to" ought never to be neglected in considering the extent of a legislative 
power…what they require is a relevance to or connection with the subject.”217 
 
The broadest view of the scope of the aliens power was that taken by Justice McHugh, 
who explicitly held that detention falls directly under s51(xix). His Honour stated that the 
aliens power, “is limited only by the description of the subject matter,”218 holding that the 
Migration Act was a law, “with respect to the subject of aliens,” because it applied to 
aliens.219 Likewise, Justice Toohey stated that the law was supported by the aliens power 
because, “it is part of a regime dealing with aliens.”220 
 
For Chief Justice Mason, and Justices Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron, detention 
arose not from the heart of the power, but as a matter incidental to the aliens power. 
 
 
The implied incidental power with respect to aliens 
 
The existence of an implied incidental power has long been recognised by the High Court. 
As early as 1904, it was held that, “where any power or control is expressly granted, there 
                                                          
217 Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 55, 77 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Webb and 
Kitto JJ). 
218 Lim’s Case (1992) 176 CLR 1, 64 (McHugh J). 
219 Ibid 64-5 (McHugh J). 
220 Ibid 46 (Toohey J). 
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is included in the grant…every power and every control the denial of which would render 
the grant itself ineffective.221 Hence, it has been said that each head of power carries with 
it an implied incidental power, “to legislate in relation to acts, matters and things the 
control of which is found necessary to effectuate its main purpose.”222 
 
The test for whether a law can be considered necessary, as Leslie Zines points out, strikes 
a balance to, “accommodate both the function of the court and the legislative discretion of 
parliament”.223 The result of this balance is the requirement that a law be, “reasonably 
considered to be appropriate and adapted,”224 to giving effect to the power. 
 
In Lim’s Case, the majority took a narrower view of the scope of the aliens power than 
Justices McHugh and Toohey. Justice Gaudron referred to the power as a, “power to 
legislate with respect to the consequences of alienage,”225 being that: 
 
Aliens…have no right to enter or remain in Australia unless such right is 
expressly granted. Laws regulating their entry to and providing for their 
departure from Australia (including deportation, if necessary) are directly 
connected with their alien status. And laws specifying the conditions on and 
subject to which they may enter and remain in Australia are also connected 
with their status as aliens to the extent that they are capable of being seen as 
appropriate or adapted to regulating entry or facilitating departure if and when 
departure is required.226 
 
 
                                                          
221 D’Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91, 110 (Griffith CJ). 
222 Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 55, 77 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Webb and 
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224 Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272, 297 (Mason CJ). See also: Re Director of Public 
Prosecutions; Ex parte Lawler (1994) 179 CLR 270, 286 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
225 Lim’s Case (1992) 176 CLR 1, 56-7 (Gaudron J). 
226 Ibid 57 (Gaudron J). 
Page 67 of 99 
A similar position appears to have been taken by Justices Brennan, Deane and Dawson, 
who on one reading appeared to take a similar view to Justices McHugh and Toohey, 
before clearly relying on the implied incidental power for their holding that: 
 
authority to detain an alien in custody, when conferred upon the Executive in 
the context and for the purposes of an executive power of deportation or 
expulsion, constitutes an incident of that executive power. By analogy, 
authority to detain an alien in custody, when conferred in the context and for 
the purposes of executive powers to receive, investigate and determine an 
application by that alien for an entry permit and (after determination) to admit 
or deport, constitutes an incident of those executive powers.227 
 
 
Chief Justice Mason explicitly agreed with this proposition.228 The majority view, then, 
appears to be that the aliens power is a power, “to receive, investigate and determine an 
application by [an] alien for an entry permit and (after determination) to admit or 
deport”.229 The power to detain aliens during this process, in order to enable those matters 
to be dealt with, is an incident of that power. All members of the High Court in Lim’s 
Case found that the detention legislation was supported by the aliens power, either directly 
or by virtue of the implied incidental power. 
 
 
A ‘rule of law’ limit on the implied incidental power? 
 
There is an issue as to whether the implied incidental power is limited by the assumption 
of the rule of law, upon which the Constitution is based. In Australian Communist Party v 
Commonwealth,230 Justice Dixon raised this possibility: 
                                                          
227 Ibid 32 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
228 Ibid 10 (Mason CJ). 
229 Ibid 32 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
230 (1951) 83 CLR 1. 
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The power is ancillary or incidental to sustaining and carrying on 
government…under the Constitution and that is an instrument framed in 
accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect, 
as, for example, in separating the judicial power from the other functions of 
government, others of which are simply assumed. Among these I think it may 
fairly be said that the rule of law forms an assumption.231 
 
 
The significance of Justice Dixon’s statement is not settled. As Geoffrey Lindell has said, 
the comments, “appear to leave some scope for limiting the reach of incidental powers 
generally by reference to traditional views involving individual liberty.”232 
 
However, Bradley Selway has taken a different view, stating that, “the aspirational aspects 
of the rule of law under the Australian Constitution are left to the democratic institutions, 
not to Judges.”233 Yet, it is difficult to understand how the rule of law could not be 
intimately related to the High Court, given its role as the Federal Supreme Court.234 As Sir 
Maurice Byers points out, “for most Australians the [High] Court embodies the rule of 
law…the principle which inheres in and informs our society, enlivens the instruments 
which constitute it and guarantees the freedoms which are essential to it.”235 
 
As recently as 1998, Justices Gummow and Hayne recalled Justice Dixon’s statement, 
noting that: “the occasion has yet to rise for consideration of all that may follow from 
Dixon J’s statement.”236. As Leslie Zines has observed, “it is difficult to know what to 
                                                          
231 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193 (Dixon J). 
232 Geoffrey Lindell, “Recent Developments in the Judicial Interpretation of the Australian Constitution,” in 
Lindell (ed), above n156 1, 21. However, Linda Kirk appears to take a narrower view of Justice Dixon’s 
comment: Linda J Kirk, “Chapter III and Legislative Interference with the Judicial Process: Abebe v 
Commonwealth and Nicholas v The Queen,” in Adrienne Stone and George Williams (eds), The High Court 
at the Crossroads: Essays in Constitutional Law (2000) 119, 122. 
233 Bradley Selway, “The Attorney-General, Government Lawyers and the Rule of Law,” Paper presented to 
the Adelaide Law School Seminar Series “Do Lawyers Contribute to the Social Good?”, 16 September 
2002, 4. 
234 Australian Constitution, s71. 
235 Sir Maurice Byers, “Vote of Thanks,” in Saunders (ed), above n118 108, 108. 
236 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 381 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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make of this,” later statement.237 Their Honours were potentially taking a broad view of 
such an implication, although it is not possible to read more than that into what was said. 
 
The essential statement of the rule of law is Diceyan: “Englishmen are ruled by the law, 
and by the law alone: a man may with us be punished for a breach of law, but he can be 
punished for nothing else.”238 If the rule of law does not admit of punishment but for an 
established breach of the law, a law purportedly enacted under the incidental power would 
not be within power if it constituted a punishment, by establishing punitive detention. 
 
If the power to detain is an incident of the aliens power, this limit on the implied 
incidental power could be relevant. Detention which is punitive in character would breach 
the underlying assumption of the rule of law, and thus may fall outside the scope of the 
incidental legislative power. What makes detention punitive is explored in detail below. 
 
 
Does detention usurp the federal judicial power? 
 
Chapter III of the Constitution exclusively vests federal judicial power in the courts which 
it designates. In doing so, the Constitution establishes a separation of judicial power. This 
is a familiar concept which has been invoked on numerous occasions by the High Court. 
The implications of this were clearly expressed in the Boilermakers’ Case.239 
 
                                                          
237 Leslie Zines, “The Present State of Constitutional Interpretation,” in Stone and Williams (eds), above 
n232, 231. 
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The existence in the Constitution of Chap III and the nature of the provisions it 
contains make it clear that no resort can be made to judicial power 
except…through or in conformity with Chap III…Indeed, to study Chap III is 
to see at once that it is an exhaustive statement of the manner in which the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth is or may be vested…its very nature puts 
out of question the possibility that the legislature may be at liberty to turn away 
from Chap III to any other source of power when it makes a law giving judicial 
power exercisable within the Federal Commonwealth of Australia. No part of 
the judicial power can be conferred in virtue of any other authority or 
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Chap III.240 
 
 
The legislative powers of the Commonwealth Parliament are necessarily restricted by the 
exclusive vesting of judicial power in Chapter III courts because, “just as Parliament 
cannot vest judicial power in a body other than a court contemplated by s71 of the 
Constitution, so it cannot exercise judicial power itself.”241 It is now clear that, “an attempt 
by the Parliament to usurp or substantially interfere with “exclusively judicial functions” 
will be held unconstitutional.”242 Justice Deane expressed the principle as follows: 
 
In insisting that the judicial power of the Commonwealth be vested only in the 
courts designated by Ch III, the Constitution’s intent and meaning were that the 
judicial power would be exercised by those courts…Accordingly, the 
Parliament cannot, consistently with Ch III of the Constitution, usurp the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth by itself purporting to exercise judicial 
power in the form of legislation.243 
 
 
The issue, then, is whether the provisions of the Migration Act which establish the regime 
of mandatory detention for ‘unlawful non-citizens’ in fact purport to exercise judicial 
power. The basic principle is that the power to detain is punitive, and punitive detention is 
an exclusively judicial function. 
                                                          
240 Ibid 269-70 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). 
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The involuntary detention of a citizen in custody by the State is penal or 
punitive in character and, under our system of government, exists only as an 




Thus, if legislation purported to sanction punitive detention, it would be invalid as an 
attempt to usurp the judicial power of the Commonwealth. The issue then becomes 
whether or not detention is punitive in nature. The vital part of the quote extracted above 
is the careful use of the word ‘citizen’. Their Honours held that detention would be 
punitive and thus unconstitutional if citizens were detained. However, aliens were not so 
protected, because detention of aliens may be able to be characterised as non-punitive. 
 
Limited authority to detain an alien in custody…is neither punitive in nature 
nor part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth…it takes its character 




Notice what has happened here. The joint judgment held that detention was non-punitive 
because it fell within the incidental power. Implicitly, at least, Justices Brennan, Deane 
and Dawson, with whom Chief Justice Mason concurred on this point, characterized the 
nature of detention by reference to the criterion of whether or not the law was in fact a 
valid law supported by the implied power incidental to the aliens power. 
 
In contrast, Justice McHugh was at pains to draw a distinction between the scope of the 
aliens power and the determination of any Chapter III questions. His Honour concluded 
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that the limitation to be derived from Chapter III is a prohibition of the enactment of Bills 
of Pains and Penalties, one of the requirements of which is that there be, “a law…which 
punishes.”246 His Honour determined the appropriate test of the character of detention: 
 
Although detention under a law of the Parliament is ordinarily characterized as 
punitive in character, it cannot be so characterized if the purpose of the 
imprisonment is to achieve some legitimate non-punitive object…if 
imprisonment goes beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the non-
punitive object, it will be regarded as punitive in character.247 
 
 
Justice McHugh applied the same test for determining the nature of detention as the 
majority judges, despite drawing a distinction between the two issues of implied power 
and Chapter III limitations which the majority had considered together. 
 
The result of the decisions of Chief Justice Mason, and Justices Brennan, Deane, Dawson 
and McHugh in Lim’s Case is that immigration detention will be valid if it is, “reasonably 
capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or…to enable an 
application for an entry permit to be made and considered.”248 
 
Justice Gaudron, however, disagreed with the other members of the court, expressing 
scepticism about whether Chapter III provided any protection from detention of any sort. 
Her Honour was, “not…persuaded that legislation authorizing detention in circumstances 
involving no breach of the criminal law and travelling beyond presently accepted 
categories is necessarily and inevitably offensive to Ch III.”249 
                                                          
246 Ibid 70 (McHugh J). 
247 Ibid 71 (McHugh J). 
248 Ibid 33 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). Justice Toohey appears to have implicitly agreed with this 
approach: at 46. 
249 Lim’s Case (1992) 176 CLR 1, 55 (Gaudron J). 
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Reasonably capable of being seen as necessary? 
 
For the majority of judges in Lim’s Case, detention was held to be non-punitive as it was 
‘reasonably capable of being seen as necessary’ for a non-punitive purpose. 
 
Central to this decision were two factors. First, there was a statutory limit on detention of 
273 days after application for entry.250 Second, the provision, which is now contained in 
s198(1), that, “an officer must remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-
citizen who asks the Minister, in writing, to be so removed.” For the joint judgment, the 
combined effect of these two restrictions was to give detention a non-punitive character. 
 
In the context of that power of a designated person to bring his or her 
detention…to an end at any time, the time limitations imposed…preclude a 
conclusion that the powers of detention…exceed what is reasonably capable of 
being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or for the making and 
consideration of an entry application.251 
 
 
Justice McHugh agreed, describing the power to request deportation as, “vital,”252 whilst 
acknowledging that the choice could be seen, “as not a real choice”.253 
 
A person is not being punished if, after entering Australia without permission, 
he or she chooses to be detained in custody pending the determination of an 




                                                          
250 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s54Q (as it then stood). 
251 Lim’s Case (1992) 176 CLR 1, 34 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
252 Ibid 72 (McHugh J). 
253 Ibid 72 (McHugh J). 
254 Ibid. 
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Describing it as a ‘choice’ is unrealistic because a refugee, by definition, has a well-
founded fear of persecution if deported, and because choosing to leave means the 
abandonment of any application for refugee status in Australia as, with a debt owing to the 
Commonwealth,255 no former detainee would later be re-admitted to Australia. 
 
Justice Toohey agreed that detention was non-punitive, concluding that, “the object of 
the…legislation is to hold aliens…in custody, not for punitive purposes, but to ensure that 
they leave Australia if they are not given an entry permit.”256 
 
The clear majority position of the judges in Lim’s Case is that although punitive detention 
is exclusively judicial in character, and cannot be validly imposed by legislative or 
executive branches of government, immigration detention constituted permissible non-
punitive detention, because it was reasonably capable of being seen as necessary to the 
legitimate objective of regulating the entry to and departure from Australia of aliens. 
 
It is important to remember that the joint judgment in Lim’s Case placed great emphasis 
on a statutory limit on detention of 273 days, and on the power of a detainee to request 
immediate deportation. Although the power to request deportation remains, the 273 day 
time limit has been abolished, and detention is now without limit. The effect of this 
change on the validity of immigration detention is uncertain, although it is hard to imagine 




                                                          
255 Detainees are charged for their detention: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss209 - 212. 
256 Lim’s Case (1992) 176 CLR 1, 46 (Toohey J). 
Page 75 of 99 
Further judicial consideration 
 
In Kruger v Commonwealth,257 some members of the High Court considered the argument 
that Aboriginal children, part of the ‘Stolen Generation’, had been removed from their 
parents and detained in breach of the Chapter III prohibition of punitive detention. The 
plaintiffs failed, but two important affirmations of the decision in Lim’s Case were 
made.258 Justice Gummow, who was not on the court for Lim’s Case, expressed his view 
of the necessary test, in essentially the same terms as the majority in Lim’s Case: 
 
The question whether a power to detain persons or to take them into custody is 
to be characterised as punitive in nature, so as to attract the operation of Ch III, 
depends upon whether those activities are reasonably capable of being seen as 
necessary for a legitimate non-punitive objective. The categories of non-
punitive, involuntary detention are not closed.259 
 
 
Justice Gaudron, meanwhile, confirmed her view that detention in any form is not 
impacted by Chapter III, stating that, “it is not possible to say that…the power to authorise 
detention in custody is necessarily and exclusively judicial power…a law authorising 
detention in custody is not, of itself, offensive to Ch III.”260 
 
The detention without trial of a citizen arose for the consideration of the High Court in 
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW).261 The New South Wales government 
passed the Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) to provide for the detention of Gregory 
                                                          
257 (1997) 190 CLR 1. 
258 Brennan CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ, did not consider Chapter III in Kruger, as they regarded it as 
inapplicable to the territories: Williams, Human Rights, above n5, 207. 
259 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 161 (Gummow J). Justice Gummow’s reference to ‘a power 
to detain persons’ is presumably to a power bestowed by legislation on the Commonwealth executive to 
detain persons, because ‘to detain persons’ is not a placitum of legislative power in s51 of the Constitution. 
260 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 110 (Gaudron J). 
261 (1995) 189 CLR 51. This case is discussed in Williams, Human Rights, above n5, 210-14, 242. 
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Wayne Kable, on the order of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, after the 
completion of his sentence for manslaughter.262 The whole of the act was declared invalid. 
 
Justice Toohey contrasted the detention of Kable with, “a system of preventive detention 
with appropriate safeguards, consequent upon or ancillary to the adjudication of guilt,”263 
concluding that detention was punitive because of a lack of appropriate safeguards and 
lack of an appropriate connection to a criminal trial. 
 
Justice Gaudron referred to the fact that detention occurred in a prison, that the detainee 
was subject to the same regime as persons convicted of criminal offences,264 and that 
material not acceptable as evidence was considered.265 The combination of these factors 
rendered detention punitive for Justice Gaudron. 
 
Justice McHugh regarded the fact that a court order was necessary to initiate detention as a 
safeguard indicating non-punitive detention,266 but contrasted this with the overall express 
removal of, “the ordinary protections inherent in the judicial process,”267 which 
determined the punitive nature of the provisions. 
 
Justice Gummow compared the position of a detainee to an ordinary prisoner. His Honour 
considered the fact a detainee would be required to be held in prison, that no fixed term of 
detention was set, that no parole would be available, and that no bail was available.268 In 
light of this lack of safeguards, Justice Gummow also found detention to be punitive. 
                                                          
262 The Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) applied to Gregory Wayne Kable alone: s3(3). 
263 Kable (1995) 189 CLR 51, 98 (Toohey J). 
264 Ibid 105 (Gaudron J). 
265 Ibid 106 (Gaudron J). 
266 Ibid 121 (McHugh J). 
267 Ibid 123 (McHugh J). 
268 Ibid 129 (Gummow J). 
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It is not possible to determine a conclusive test for punitive detention from the decisions in 
Kable. However, it appears that whether or not detention is punitive does depend on the 
conditions of detention and the legal safeguards in place. Immigration detention occurs in 
ordinary prisons269 or in prison-like conditions,270 is indeterminate, and bail and parole are 
not available. Many of the indications of punitive detention are present. 
 
 
Conditions of detention and the ‘reasonably necessary’ test 
 
The majority view is that detention will be non-punitive providing that it is ‘reasonably 
capable of being seen as necessary’ for a legitimate non-punitive objective. It has been 
held that, “the substance and not the mere form,”271 of a law authorising detention should 
be considered, and that, “the length and circumstances of the detention contemplated 
are…significant.”272 In addition, the presence or lack of appropriate procedural safeguards 
is relevant to the issue of whether or not detention is ‘reasonably capable of being seen as 
necessary’ to some non-punitive objective.273 
 
In Chapter I, it was suggested that, in the absence of any legislative provisions changing 
the ordinary rule, the principle that prisoners cannot challenge their detention on the basis 
of the conditions of detention applies to people in immigration detention. This section 
                                                          
269 “Immigration detention” is defined in s5 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to include being held: “in a 
detention centre...prison or remand centre...police station or watch house” or any other “place approved by 
the Minister in writing”. 
270 Crock and Saul, above n2, 84, describe all detention facilities simply: “The facilities are jails.” Special 
mention is made of the desert detention facilities: “Remote centres are similar to prisoner-of-war camps.” 
271 The Queen v Garry Kenneth McKay and The Queen v Darren John West, [1998] ACTSC 128 
(Unreported, Crispin J, 2 December 1998), [11]. 
272 Ibid [14]. 
273 See eg S v Principal Reporter and Lord Advocate [2001] ScotCS 82 (Unreported, Lord President, Lords 
Penrose and Macfadyen, 30th March 2001), where it was held that Regulations specifically protecting the 
welfare of children in detention ‘preserved’ the non-punitive object of the relevant legislation. 
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develops an argument that the conditions of detention can change detention which is 
otherwise ‘reasonably necessary’ into unreasonable and unnecessary detention, which, 
being punitive, violates Chapter III of the Constitution. 
 
A deeper analysis of what is ‘reasonably capable of being seen as necessary’ to enable 
consideration of applications for entry visas, and to deport persons as required, would also 
look to the conditions of immigration detention to determine if detention is punitive. This 
is because a regime of immigration detention that did only what was ‘reasonably 
necessary’ would violate only those rights whose violation could be justified as necessary 
to achieve its legitimate purpose. 
 
George Williams gives examples of two comparative perspectives on this issue. In the 
United States, he refers to a doctrine that where legislatures use, “means which sweep 
unnecessarily broadly,”274 in infringing human rights, they exceed what is permissible. In 
Canada, he refers to a test which requires that, “the means, even if rationally connected to 
the objective…should impair ‘as little as possible’ the right or freedom in question”.275 
 
Both examples may be distinguished, but the principle they protect is very important. As 
Louis Henkin points out, “a society may derogate from rights only to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation.”276 The principle is expressed in the Basic 
Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted by the General Assembly: 
 
 
                                                          
274 NAACP v Alabama 377 US 288 (1964), 307 (Harlan J); cited in Williams, Human Rights, above n, 90. 
275 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103, 139 (Dickson CJ); cited in Williams, Human Rights, above n, 89. 
276 Henkin, above n163, 4; quoted in Blackshield and Williams, above n6, 1090. 
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Except for those limitations that are demonstrably necessitated by the fact of 
incarceration, all prisoners shall retain the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.277 
 
 
Richard Harding described the conditions of immigration detention very succinctly as, “an 
absolute disgrace”.278 There have been allegations of, “sexual and other assault…abuse of 
refugee children, repeated hunger strikes, suicide attempts, mass disturbances, the use of 
chemical sedation, and even death in detention centres across Australia.”279 
 
International concern has also been raised. In May 2002, P. N. Bhagwati conducted a visit 
to Australia as a personal envoy of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, to investigate the human rights situation in Australia’s immigration detention 
centres. He reported that he was, “considerably distressed by what he saw and heard,” 
which he described as, “a great human tragedy”.280 
 
Justice Bhagwati went on to question Australia’s compliance with certain provisions of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,281 the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,282 the 
                                                          
277 Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, GA Res 45/111, UN GAOR, 45th sess, 68th plen mtg, 
UN Doc. A/RES/45/111(1990), Principle 5. See also: Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, UN Doc. A/CONF/611(1955), art 60(1): “The regime…should seek to minimize any differences 
between prison life and life at liberty.” 
278 Professor Richard Harding (Inspector of Custodial Services, State of Western Australia), Speech to the 
International Corrections and Prisons Association Conference, Perth, 31 October 2001. 
279 Crock and Saul, above n2, 3. 
280 Justice P N Bhagwati, “Mission to Australia 24 May to 2 June 2002: Human Rights and Immigration 
Detention in Australia,” 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/BC4C8230F96684C8C1256C070032F5F1?opendocu
ment> [20]. 
281 Bhagwati, above n280, [62]. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n44. 
282 Bhagwati, above n280, [62]. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 Dec 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 
1987). 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,283 the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,284 and the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under 
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.285 
 
The failure to provide any mechanism of enforcing human rights is critical. Even if the 
legislation does not itself sanction breaches of human rights, the failure of detention 
legislation to provide any mechanism of enforcing basic rights (the exercise of which is 
not relevant to the power to detain) is a strong indication that the regime of immigration 
detention has gone beyond what is necessary. 
 
Notwithstanding any justification of a breach of the right to liberty and security of the 
person as a necessary incident of the power to admit or deport aliens, no justification has 
been advanced for a breach of any other fundamental rights. No justification could be 
given for the indiscriminate violations of human rights which have been alleged. 
 
Taking a deeper view, it is hard to see how detention could be regarded as ‘reasonably 
necessary’ when the conditions of detention violate not just the right to liberty and 
security of the person, but sweep much wider, infringing a number of fundamental human 
rights. Any claim to violate basic human rights must be held to a strict test of whether 
such violations are in fact ‘reasonably necessary’, lest Australia become like John 
Milton’s Satan, who, “with necessity, the tyrant’s plea, excus’d his devilish deeds.”286 
 
                                                          
283 Bhagwati, above n280, [49]. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, above 
n44. 
284 Bhagwati, above n280, [51], [52], [53], [61]. 
285 Body of Principles, above n14. 
286 John Milton, Paradise Lost (1667) bk 4, l 393; quoted in Bill Swainson (ed), Encarta Book of Quotations 
(2000), 650. 
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Akram Al Masri 
 
The first recent case in Australia to consider the validity of immigration detention was Al 
Masri v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs.287 Justice Merkel 
of the Federal Court ordered the release from potentially indefinite immigration detention 
of Akram Al Masri, a detainee who had requested to be deported, but at the time could not 
be deported. 
 
Justice Merkel’s decisions did not challenge the Constitutional validity of immigration 
detention. Rather, Justice Merkel applied the Hardial Singh principles, determining that 
detention was only authorised provided, “the Minister is taking all reasonable steps to 
secure the removal from Australia of a removee as soon as is reasonably practicable,” and, 
“the removal of the removee from Australia is "reasonably practicable", in the sense that 
there must be a real likelihood or prospect of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 
future.”288 
 
On the 15th of August 2002 those conditions were not met, and accordingly Justice Merkel 
released Mr Al Masri. However, by the 6th of September, deportation had been arranged, 
so there was a real likelihood of removal, and Mr Al Masri was ordered back into 
immigration detention, pending deportation. 
 
                                                          
287 Al Masri v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1009, 
(Unreported, Merkel J, 15 August 2002); Al Masri v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous 
Affairs [2002] FCA 1037 (Unreported, Merkel J, 15 August 2002); Al Masri v Minister for Immigration & 
Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1099 (Unreported, Merkel J, 6 September 2002). 
288 Al Masri v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1009 
(Unreported, Merkel J, 15 August 2002), [38]. 
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Approving the Hardial Singh principles in Lam, the Privy Council was at pains to point 
out that, “subject to any constitutional challenge…the legislature can vary or possibly 
exclude the Hardial Singh principles.”289 Justice Merkel decided in Al Masri that the 
Migration Act did not exclude the Hardial Singh principles. 
 
Such an approach requires a strong emphasis to be placed on the rule of interpretation that 
legislation must be unambiguous to violate common law rights, at the expense of the 
reasonably clear text of the Migration Act. It is an approach that was open to be taken, but 
it is also an approach which could be criticised. In any event, in taking this approach, 
Justice Merkel did not need to consider the Constitutional issues. 
 
At the time of writing, a number of cases challenging the legality of immigration detention 
were pending or had been heard before a number of different courts in Australia. Although 
all the relevant cases at the time of writing have been included and discussed, there will be 
further judgments handed down in the near future. The issues canvassed in the foregoing 
discussion should be important factors in the consideration of these cases. 
 
                                                          
289 Lam [1997] AC 97, 111. 
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Conclusion on Domestic Legality 
 
The scope of Commonwealth legislative power and the restrictions placed on it by Chapter 
III of the Constitution, though conceptually different issues, were linked in the decisions 
of the majority of the High Court in Lim’s Case. 
 
It is accepted that the aliens power, at minimum, extends to laws which deal with the 
arrival of an alien in Australia, the investigation and determination of an application for an 
entry permit, and anything associated with the admission or deportation of an alien. 
Whether a power of detention is included is a more difficult question. The broadest 
approach, holding that any law which deals with an alien is validly enacted, gives the 
Commonwealth extraordinary powers, and should not be entertained. 
 
The majority view would appear to be that detention arises as an incident of the main 
power, to the extent that it can be viewed as coming within the incidental power. Thus, 
detention is within power when it is ‘reasonably capable of being seen as necessary’ to 
give effect to the main power. 
 
The question of whether there is a limit on the incidental power implied from the 
assumption of the rule of law, on which the Constitution is based, was discussed. This is 
another area where arguments can be made in support of this view, but where the orthodox 
approach does not confirm that such an approach will succeed. As such, the argument 
deals with a possible future development of the law, not with its current state. 
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Assuming that detention can be seen as an incident of the aliens power, it may still be 
impermissible as a usurpation of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Legislation 
providing for detention will breach Chapter III of the Constitution if the detention it 
imposes is punitive in nature 
 
In Lim’s Case, detention was said to take its character from the power under which the law 
is enacted. Accordingly, it was held that detention would be non-punitive providing it was 
‘reasonably capable of being necessary’ for a non-punitive objective, which must itself be 
within power. In Lim’s Case, it was held that immigration detention was not punitive. 
 
The result in Lim’s Case is open to serious question now. One reason for this is that 
detention is now unlimited in time, which raises significant questions about compliance 
with the ‘reasonably necessary’ test. Further, the conditions of detention have become a 
vital issue for the first time. An approach which is responsive to human rights and gives 
meaningful effect to the ‘reasonably necessary’ test would consider the conditions of 
detention. This approach would not be tantamount to implementing international 
conventions by the back door. Rather, it would question the ‘reasonableness’ and 
‘necessity’ of violating a large number of human rights, when even the strongest possible 
justification would allow only a limited restriction of the right to liberty and security of the 
person. This approach would break new ground, but is based on the existing, accepted test. 
 
The fact that immigration detention is now unlimited in time and that allegations of the 
most serious nature have been made about the conditions of detention fundamentally 
distinguish the current regime of immigration detention from that considered by the High 
Court in Lim’s Case, raising significant issues about the legality of the current regime. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The conclusion of Chapter I is that Australia’s mandatory detention of ‘unlawful non-
citizens’ under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is in breach of the international prohibition 
of arbitrary detention. As a consequence, Australia is in breach of its obligations under 
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
 
In Chapter II it was seen that, on a conservative view of Australian law, no domestic 
consequences flow from this international illegality. However, it is argued that this view is 
unsustainable, and that international law must be regarded as relevant to interpreting the 
Constitution. The High Court has been reluctant to accept such an approach, although 
powerful arguments can be made in support of it. 
 
It is also argued that certain key common law rights ‘run so deep’ they may not be 
abrogated by parliament. Drawing on the common law tradition, it is suggested that the 
right to liberty and security of the person is just such a right, and that international human 
rights law is relevant to determining the scope of this fundamental right. 
 
In Chapter III, the decision in Lim’s Case was examined. Since Lim’s Case it has been 
widely assumed that detention without trial can the be norm for ‘unlawful non-citizens’ 
although such a power could not lawfully be exercised over Australian citizens. However, 
the legality of immigration detention, both by reference to the scope of Commonwealth 
legislative power, and limits derived from Chapter III of the Constitution, is open to 
significant challenge. 
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That detention is unlimited in duration and that the conditions are not open to challenge 
both indicate that the regime of immigration detention is not ‘reasonably necessary’ for 
the administrative purpose of facilitating entry to and departure from Australia. This 
changes the character of immigration detention from non-punitive to punitive, and 
breaches the exclusive vesting of judicial power in Chapter III of the Constitution. 
 
An acceptable regime of administrative detention would guarantee to each detainee as 
many of the rights of an ordinary citizen as possible, whilst permitting deprivation of the 
right to liberty and security of the person only to the extent that is demonstrably 
reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances. It would guard against, rather than 
invite, violations of other human rights. 
 
The tests applied under international law and Australian law are fundamentally different. 
In Chapter I, the international test was shown to require that detention be both reasonable 
and necessary in all the circumstances. In Chapter III, the Australian test was shown to 
require that detention be ‘reasonably capable of being seen as necessary’. Apart from the 
very different interpretations of what is ‘reasonable’ and ‘necessary’ internationally and 
within Australia, the more fundamental point is the weakness of the Australian test. 
 
International law requires that the imposition of detention be positively demonstrated to be 
both reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances, for each individual detained. In 
contrast, Australian law requires only that the legislation establishing the regime of 
immigration detention be reasonably capable of being seen as necessary – there is no 
requirement that detention be reasonable at all, and detention need not be actually 
necessary, so long as it is reasonably capable of being seen as necessary. 
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The weaker Australian test does not sit well with a Constitution which emphatically 
separates the judicial power from the other branches of government, and is based upon 
fundamental notions of the rule of law and liberal democratic principles. Nor does the 
Australian test compare favourably with the approach taken under international human 
rights law, which could beneficially be used to give proper effect to the separation of 
judicial power contained in the Australian Constitution. 
 
Mary Crock has written that the High Court, “has returned to a more constrained and 
deferential approach to the review of migration cases – a trend that may reflect an upsurge 
in the community’s concern about illegal immigration.”290 It is suggested that a deferential 
approach is not appropriate when interpreting the Australian Constitution; that community 
concerns based at least partly on, “a crisis manufactured by the government to increase its 
electoral support,”291 are inappropriate considerations; and that deference is highly 
inappropriate when human rights of fundamental importance are being violated. 
 
To the extent that the High Court has adopted an approach that is deferential to the 
intentions of parliament but gives weak effect to protections enshrined in the Australian 
Constitution, it may be viewed as complicit in the violation of fundamental human rights 
which are constitutionally protected. It is the duty of the High Court, under the Australian 
Constitution, to jealously guard the exclusively judicial function of imposing punitive 
detention. Vigilance, not deference, is required when the legislative or executive arms of 
government are accused of attempting to impose punitive detention or the, “judicial power 
may be eroded…contrary to the clear intention of the Constitution.”292 
                                                          
290 Mary Crock, “Immigration Law” in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The 
Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001), 333. 
291 Crock and Saul, above n2, 2. 
292 Liyanage v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 259, 291-2 (Lord Pearce). 
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The reasons why Australia should respect the obligations of international human rights 
law go beyond the fact that those obligations are legally binding on Australia 
internationally. International human rights law is justified by ideals such as freedom, 
integrity, dignity, justice and humanity.293 These ideals are much more than mere 
rhetoric.294 Not only are they ideals worth striving for, they are ideals embedded deeply in 
Australia’s legal system. 
 
The words of Nelson Mandela seem particularly appropriate in conclusion. 
 
The oppressor must be liberated just as surely as the oppressed. A man who 
takes away another man’s freedom is a prisoner of hatred, he is locked away 
behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if I am 
taking away someone else’s freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my 




International human rights law requires Australia to treat with humanity all ‘unlawful non-
citizens’. This is not a concept which could be described as ‘alien’ to the Australian legal 
system. International human rights law offers the opportunity to define and develop 
existing fundamental principles of Australian law, and give full effect to the Australian 
Constitution’s requirement that courts be the final arbiter of when a human being can be 
denied the fundamental right to liberty and security of the person. 
                                                          
293 These words were taken from the Charter of the United Nations, above n24, Preamble; Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, above n21, Preamble; and Higgins, above n31, 96. 
294 In contrast, the Australian government’s attitude to human rights, “can be viewed as little better than 
rhetoric”: Morgan, above n142, 63. The right to a fair trial was described as ‘rhetoric’ in Dietrich (1992) 177 
CLR 292, 324-5 (Brennan J). 
295 Nelson Mandela, The Long Walk to Freedom (1994), 751. 
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